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The aim of this thesis is to apply a systems engineering approach for the 
conceptual design of a frigate to meet its operational requirements. The thesis explores 
the applicability of the University College London Numerical Warship Design Procedure 
to find ship dimensions. In order for the design to be viable, the procedure iterates until 
the ship displacement is equal to the weight of the groups, and the volume available in 
the hull and superstructure is equal to or larger than the calculated volume required. 
The Topside Sizing Model (TSM) is introduced and added to the Numerical 
Warship Design Procedure to find feasible and satisfactory conceptual ship designs. This 
thesis also provides guidance to ship topside designers in the methodology of integrating 
weapon and platform systems onboard a surface ship. A spiral model for Integrated 
Topside Design (ITD) is introduced and explained.  
Lastly, this thesis uses NPS capability engineering for its cost-effectiveness model 
to examine several design alternatives and trade-offs in the capability of the frigate versus 
its cost of procurement. 
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This thesis is based on a systems engineering approach and design methodology 
with topside considerations and cost-capability analysis in designing and selecting a cost-
effective conceptual frigate design that meets all the measures of effectiveness (MOEs). 
The systems engineering approach ensures that the stakeholders’ requirements are 
fulfilled. Based on the mission needs, different sets of payload configuration can be 
inserted and evaluated using the design methodology to derive satisfactory conceptual 
ship designs. The topside sizing model improves the topside layout by enabling divergent 
thinking to generate new ship designs and, at the same time, incorporating topside design 
considerations.  
Using Minitab, factorial analysis was performed to determine the impact of the 
various defense attributes on the performance of the overall defense (average number of 
leakers that target the AWSs per run). This allowed for the identification of attributes that 
have higher leverage on performance. 
From the results of a Back of the Envelope (BOE) simulation, it can be seen that 
the existing defense payload configuration is insufficient to protect five frigates and four 
AWS from a swarm of 200 missiles. A Design of Experiments (DOE) result suggests that 
the kill probability of the BlueIntercept missile and RCS have a significant impact in 
defending and protecting the frigates and AWS in surviving the swarm attack of the 
RedFire missiles. 
An assessment of all the 41 alternatives with calculated costs, different 
combination of payloads, and system effectiveness is analyzed. From the cost-
effectiveness plot, Option 34, the baseline payload configuration with the only an 
upgrade to surveillance radar model 2 (higher sensor detection range) and to ATTD 
model 3 (higher probability of kill at 0.8 and range at 12 kyds), is the recommended 
solution. This option fulfilled the MOEs at the lowest cost of $618.925M per frigate. It is 
recommended that the detection range of surveillance radar and the ATTD be upgraded. 
This would enable the fleet to survive the swarm of RedFire missile attacks. The analysis 
 xviii 
provides stakeholders with a quantitative evaluation of costs and capabilities of the vessel 
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New naval ship designs are usually created in response to needs, such as the onset 
of new technologies, new operational requirements, changes in world politics, and 
lessons learned. These needs are identified by the stakeholders (e.g., naval planners) and 
are used as a basis for new naval ship design development. Ship designers must deal with 
a variety of stakeholders’ requirements, and operating and maintenance concepts. They 
must take all of these inputs into their design considerations, explore alternatives, and 
later demonstrate to stakeholders their proposed design alternatives that meet the required 
functional and operational needs. In the process, they introduce and explain to the 
stakeholders the trade-offs and feasible design regions.  
During the exploration of feasible designs, a lot of information about the ship 
structure, platform system, and combat system remains unknown/minimal/vague 
information to the designers, which poses great challenge to the overall ship design. 
These new naval ship design alternatives can take a long time to design. The proposed 
conceptual ship design alternatives may not be capable of meeting all of the stakeholders’ 
requirements.  
The ship and its topside designs are usually based on previous experience, lessons 
learned, and advice from chief designers. During initial conceptual design, assumptions 
have to be made and extra space margins have to be catered for items with uncertainty. A 
systems engineering design approach for both ship and its topside design can be 
introduced to assist ship designers at the conceptual design stage. Thus, the preliminary 
ship weight, dimensions, and topside size of a naval vessel can be approximated and 
determined based on the payload configuration, such as weaponry and electronics. It is 
also important to conduct the overall ship designs in conjunction with such analyses as 
ship stability, speed, power, and system availability studies to demonstrate the feasibility 
of its design. 
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Hopefully, this systems engineering approach will help ship designers improve 
their ships and topside designs in a short time. In the future, as ship designs and systems 
become more complex in accordance with higher stakeholder requirements, there will 
always be increased challenges in the design of the ship and its topside. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The thesis is centered on the conceptual design of a frigate. During this 
conceptual design phase, there are general stakeholders’ needs (e.g., operational 
requirements) of the frigate. This conceptual design stage has many different feasible 
design solutions. It is important at this stage that the ship designer has a method to enable 
the consideration of all the topside issues because these can drive the overall size of the 
ship (Brown 1987).   
The main objective of this work is to propose a systems engineering approach to 
assist the ship designer understand the stakeholders’ needs and values, design parameters, 
and evaluate various design alternatives during the conceptual design stage.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A literature review was conducted prior to the commencement of this thesis. This 
thesis extends the work from two University of College London (UCL) theses, one by 
Jonathan Andrew Bayliss (2003) and the other by Timothy Patrick McDonald (2010).  
The ship design process is iterative, like a spiral model (Evans 1959), towards an 
efficient design. The capabilities needs of the required ship are identified, and the design 
is refined to meet needs as the concept develops. The first portion of this thesis applies a 
systems engineering approach in the ship design process, as in the work done by Choi 
(2009), Letourneau (2009), Gaitan (2011), Fox (2011), and Bahlman (2012). 
The first thesis (Bayliss 2003) dealt with a methodology for topside design and 
integration in conceptual warship design. The thesis includes the UCL Numerical 
Warship Design Procedure, which derives a balanced frigate design with weight, volume, 
and principal dimensions. There is also a similar mathematical model for the design of 
naval vessel frigates (Graham and Hamly 1975). However, these two mathematical 
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models do not include any topside layout, topside design considerations, or sizing, nor 
does it include a preliminary topside physical feasibility check. Thus, this thesis extends 
Bayliss’s (2003) previous work by adding a topside sizing model, which provides a more 
accurate and satisfactory conceptual ship design to allow for better vessel cost 
forecasting.  
The second thesis (McDonald 2010) introduces cost capability analysis, which 
explores the impact of payload and requirements on different platforms through the 
Numerical Warship Design Procedure. However, this thesis uses NPS Capability 
Engineering for the cost capability analysis portion through the Numerical Warship 
Design Procedure with the topside sizing model (as an add-on) for design concept 
selection. 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS WORK 
The scope of this thesis work is presented in four chapters: 
Chapter II addresses the systems engineering approach, which includes needs 
identification, scenario development, functions, and requirements of the frigate. 
Chapter III details the spiral model for Integrated Topside Design (ITD) and the 
topside design considerations 
Part 1 of Chapter IV details the design stage, which evaluates the impact of 
payload on the ship dimensions using UCL Numerical Warship Design Procedure. Part 2 
of the design stage investigates the size of the topside and includes topside design 
considerations using the Topside Sizing Model. The ship synthesis model considers only 
monohull vessels. The study of other hull forms is not considered and could be 
recommended for future research. 
Chapter V illustrates the cost capability analysis using NPS Capability 
Engineering. Lastly, from the analysis of alternatives (AOA), several feasible solutions 
that meet the overall measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are proposed and evaluated. 
Figure 1 shows the overview of this thesis in terms of the flow of the systems 
engineering approach for the conceptual design of a frigate.  
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II. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH FOR CONCEPTUAL 
DESIGN OF FRIGATE 
The Systems Engineering Process (SEP; Defense Acquisition University [DAU] 
2001), displayed in Figure 2, is applied to this conceptual design of the frigate to result in 
a more desirable and satisfactory outcome. It is a comprehensive and iterative problem-
solving process. The SEP is to first define the problem, determine the effective needs, 
and then develop a solution.  
Figure 2.  Systems Engineering Process 
 
From Defense Acquisition University (DAU), System Engineering Fundamentals, Fort 
Belvoir, VA: Defense Acquisition University Press, 2001. 
A good systems engineering approach requires an agreed problem and boundaries 
shared by stakeholders. The problem has to be identified and determined by the end user. 
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The end user and all the relevant stakeholders must discuss and agree on the problem and 
the possible solutions. The problem statement for this thesis is identified in Figure 3. 
Figure 3.  The Problem Statement 
 
 
Stakeholder analysis consists of three components: (1) identifying stakeholders 
and defining their roles in system development and use; (2) researching stakeholder 
documents to analyze their needs; and (3) performing interviews and engaging in two-
way communications about requirements. A stakeholder can be the owner of the ship 
(Navy), project manager, weapons and defense system contractors/manufacturer, 
shipyard, contractor trainer and operator who have interests in the project. The 
stakeholders have different perspectives of the system and can affect/change the ship 
system’s requirements. Stakeholder analysis has to be carried out to understand the 
stakeholders’ effective needs and wants with respect to the problem. The stakeholders 
must communicate effectively and understand the needs of the end user, which is 
currently a capability gap within the littoral environment. The system dynamics, such as 
the boundaries, interactions with stakeholders, constraints, assumptions, limitations, and 
scope of the project, are first examined and thought through in order to provide the 
system with an effective need. The problem statement is then revised to the effective 
need, as shown in Figure 4. 




The problem is that the end user (Navy) is concerned about the increasing asymmetric 
threats within the maritime/littorals environment, particularly swarm missiles and 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). 
    
The effective need is a new fleet of five multi-roles stealth frigates required by the 
end user (Navy) to confront both conventional and asymmetric threats, especially 
swarm missiles/UAVs, within the maritime/littoral environment. 
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In the needs analysis phase, operational needs and requirements are required to be 
identified by the stakeholders and must exist for the new system (five multi-roles stealth 
frigates) (Kossiakoff and Sweet 2002). 
With the clearly defined effective need, requirement analysis shall be performed 
to analyze the projected needs for the new system, determine what the operational 
objectives are, and determine the concept of operations (CONOPS) of the end user. A 
CONOPS for the system that is the new fleet of five multi-role stealth frigates is 
developed by the end user. The CONOPS describes the use of system solution and its 
context. The primary objective of the CONOPS was to ensure all stakeholders of the 
operational objectives and requirements. The CONOPS for the new fleet of multi-role 
stealth frigates that have been designated by the stakeholders are anti-air warfare (AAW), 
anti-surface warfare (ASuW), and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). These frigates shall be 
specifically optimized for the AAW role to counter the swarm missiles and UAVs. Some 
of the key design considerations will definitely be the surface-to-air missiles (SAM) 
system (primary anti-air weapon), and the secondary anti-air weapon will be the main 
gun system. The frigates shall also be equipped with an area terminal type defense 
(ATTD) system and a counter measures (CM) system to improve their survivability 
against swarm missiles and UAVs. The primary sensors for AAW are the electronic 
support measures (ESM), long-range surveillance radar for search and detection of 
threats, and fire control radar (FCR) for precise target tracking purposes. The system 
performance will be characterized by the survivability of the frigates against the swarm 
missiles and UAVs. The system’s CONOPS are to be discussed with all the stakeholders 
to clarify the operational scenario of the system.  
Scenarios are thought of from the CONOPS, which highlights some of the issues 
that arise should certain components of the system fail. The following scenarios (as 
shown in Appendix A and vignettes) are highly possible once the system is put in place. 
The system (new fleet of multi-role stealth frigate) should be adequately prepared for 
them. These scenarios enable the system engineers and ship designers to consider the 
alternatives solution later during the design phase.  
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After understanding the needs, CONOPs, and constraints of the stakeholders, 
functional analysis has to be performed for the operational objectives of the system to be 
translated into desired functions. The functional analysis phase of the systems 
engineering process allows individual component functions of a concept to be determined 
and then later developed further into the means to execute the functions in an operational 
environment. Functional decomposition is performed to breakdown the functions 
requirements into sub-function forms. The functional architecture of the system is, first, 
defining all the pertinent high-level functions; second, decomposing the functions into 
logical groupings of “high-level” and “derived” functions; third, organizing the functions 
into appropriate model diagrams that indicate the logical ordering or relation of functions; 
and fourth, performing an analysis of the functional architecture in order to understand 
what would need to be accomplished by the entire system of systems to make the solution 
concept valid. 
As stated earlier, the scenarios are developed to help stakeholders understand 
what possible functions would be essential to the operation of the AAW. When the 
functional hierarchy for the AAW was developed using Vitech Core, the functions were 
then implemented into the operational scenario to determine the functional sequencing. 
The functional flow block diagram (FFBD; Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011) can be created 
to show how component functions are implemented in the scenario and determine 
whether there are missing functions that need to be developed. 
As illustrated in Figures 19–23 of Appendix B, by decomposing the functions, 
many pertinent features of the AAW system could be derived, and these insights can be 
used to generate accurate system requirements. This provides a good skeleton of the 
system where other sub-functions can be built. Further decomposing the functions 
provided even more insights into the plausible methods of solving the problem. 
The functions are assigned to a measure of performance (MOP), its respective 
measures, and a design goal after discussion review with stakeholders. Measures are 
properties, traits, and attributes that are qualitatively and quantitatively determinable. 
Langford (2012, pg 363) states that “Metrics are key to ultimately defining the system, 
establishing meaningful and verifiable requirements, and testing the system.” Therefore, 
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it is important to define the metrics completely and accurately for the system 
development life cycle. 
• MOE is a measure which expresses the extent of a system achieves its 
objectives/missions/tasks under specified conditions (Kossiakoff and 
Sweet 2002). An example of MOE can be probability of mission 
accomplishment.  
• MOP is a quantitative measure of a system’s capabilities or specific 
performance function (Kossiakoff and Sweet 2002). An example of MOP 
can be the percent of successful hits, missile speed.  
The Navy is concerned about the survival of its high valued assets. The MOE for 
this thesis is the survivability of Frigates and AWS. This would be translated to the list 
of MOP in Table 1. 
The number of frigates and AWS sunk would directly measure the overall defense 
capability of the naval fleet. This depends on the ability of SAM, main gun, decoy, and 
ATTD systems to intercept incoming threats. From the MOP, the functions identified 
should be traceable back to requirements. The system requirements are allocated to all 
functional levels. The system requirements that are derived from the functions shall also 
be mapped to the needs of the stakeholders. This is an iterative process of checking the 
basic system requirements against the stakeholders’ needs. The mapping enables the 
system engineers and ship designers to verify whether all stakeholders’ needs are being 
addressed by the system requirements. 
In the synthesis phase, the functional architecture is mapped to the physical 
architecture, as shown in Table 7 in Appendix B. The functions identified earlier are 
allocated and mapped to high level objects/system. Physical decomposition is performed 
for the higher level system and broken down into its sub-entities. From the decomposition 
effort, alternative designs can be developed. The payload configuration versus mission 
capabilities can now be generated, as shown in Appendix C. AOA can then be performed 
before a solution is implemented. The selected solution are verifiable to the set of 
requirements, and the end results are validated as an acceptable solution to the agreed-
upon problem. 
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Table 1.   Summary of Measure of Effectiveness and Measure of Performance  
No Measure of Performance (MOP) Objective Descriptions 
1 
Number of RedFire 
Missile  intercepted by 
SAM 
To Maximize 
The number of RedFire Missile intercepted is used as a measure of the 
BlueIntercept System’s (1st layer of defense) ability to engage and 
destroy them. 
2 Number of BlueIntercept Leakers targeting frigates To Minimize 
The number of BlueIntercept Leakers targeting at frigates has a direct 
relationship with the number of incoming threats destroyed by the 
system. The number of BlueIntercept Leakers targeting frigates is used as 
a measure of the BlueIntercept System’s (1st layer of defense) ability to 
engage and destroy incoming threats. 
3 Number of BlueIntercept Leakers targeting AWS To Minimize 
The number of BlueIntercept Leakers targeting AWS has a direct 
relationship with the number of incoming threats destroyed by the 
system. The number of BlueIntercept Leakers targeting AWS is used as a 
measure of the BlueIntercept System’s (1st layer of defense) ability to 
engage and destroy incoming threats. 
4 
Number of RedFire 
Missile  intercepted by 
Main Gun 
To Maximize The number of RedFire Missile intercepted is used as a measure of the Main Gun’s (2nd layer of defense) ability to engage and destroy them. 
5 
Number of RedFire 
Missile  attracted by 
Decoy 
To Maximize The number of RedFire Missile intercepted is used as a measure of the Decoy’s (countermeasure) ability to attract them. 
6 
Number of RedFire 
Missile  intercepted by 
ATTD 
To Maximize The number of RedFire Missile intercepted is used as a measure of the ATTD’s (3rd layer of defense) ability to engage and destroy them. 
7 Number of ATTD Leakers To Minimize 
The number of ATTD Leakers has a direct relationship with the number of 
frigates and AWS sunk and the ship survivability. The number of ATTD 
Leakers is used as a measure of the defenses of the frigates and AWS. 
No Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) Objective Descriptions 




Warships (AWS)  
To Maximize This measure reflects the survivability of the asset against incoming threat. 
From Matthew Boensel, Capability Engineering [Lecture notes], Department of Systems 
Engineering, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2015. 
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III. INTEGRATED TOPSIDE DESIGN 
A. OVERVIEW 
Integrated Topside Design (ITD) is a complex task in designing and shaping the 
topside superstructure and at the same time optimizing the locations of all necessary 
topside equipment on the weather deck and superstructure of a naval vessel to minimize 
interactions. 
The topside of a warship must be able to accommodate a wide array of combat 
systems (CS); command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I); 
and hull, mechanical, and electrical (HM&E) functions while maintaining maximum 
functionality and performance of all systems for their intended missions (Baron et al. 
2002). This is achieved by identifying and reducing risks of interference related to 
equipment on board a warship. Additionally, the ITD effort is to make explicit any 
radiation hazards onboard the vessel. 
At the same time, the topside of the ship must continue serving the basic ship 
operational functions, such as vertical replenishment (VERTREP), refueling at sea 
(RAS), flight operations, small boat deployment, docking and maneuvering, personnel 
movement, and even deployment of mission modules, all while meeting overall ship 
signature requirements and imposing minimal manning and mission requirements. 
The objectives of this ITD chapter are for ship designers to (1) maximize combat 
system operability, maintainability, and functionality; (2) understand and check for 
unforeseen problems that can be identified early in the initial design conceptual and 
preliminary phase of the ship using the Topside Design Checklist; and (3) size the topside 
superstructure using the Topside Sizing Model.  
B. CHALLENGES FACED BY TOPSIDE DESIGNERS 
The current process for designing and procuring a new naval vessel is time 
consuming. The following is a brief outline of the stages involved in naval shipbuilding: 
1. Conceptual or tender phase 
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2. Contractual phase  
3. Preliminary design review (PDR) phase 
4. Critical design review (CDR) phase 
5. Production phase 
6. Harbor Acceptance Test (HAT) 
7. Electromagnetic interference/electromagnetic compatibility (EMI/EMC) 
trial 
8. Sea Acceptance Test (SAT) 
9. Live Firing Test (LFT), if part of the agreed contract stated for the vessel 
10. Operation phase 
11. Disposal phase  
At the conceptual phase, based on preliminary requirements given by the 
stakeholders, the first challenge is to have the topside designers design and position many 
weapons, electromagnetic (EM) radiators, and platform hardware on the topside of the 
warship. Their constraints are the limited real estate and the weight of the naval ship.  
The second challenge is that the topside of a naval ship contains typically 30 to 50 
antenna systems, which are placed in close proximity to each other. This raises the 
problem of EMI, which causes performance degradation of the antenna systems, 
blockage of communication channels, and even burn-out of inadequately protected 
equipment. The topside designers need the topside equipment specification information 
for ITD analysis. However, this information is usually available only at a later design 
stage, such as after contract signing of equipment. At times, the information can be 
obtained from the system supplier earlier and upon requests by the defense office or 
shipyard. Based on preliminary suppliers’ equipment specification information, design 
experience, and databases, the topside designers then design a preliminary topside layout 
and generate a preliminary ITD analysis. The detailed ITD analysis and calculation can 
begin only when all the equipment specification information is available. 
The third challenge is positioning, shaping, and sizing the choice of material of 
the topside superstructure especially for the forward (fwd) and aft mast.  
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During the CDR phase, there may be stakeholder needs to redesign the topside 
layout in terms of reshaping the structure, repositioning, and even placing additional 
topside equipment. However, at this phase, most of the HM&E designs have already been 
finalized. This results in time and cost implications to the overall project.  
Lastly and most importantly, the overall ship design must be able to achieve an 
acceptable optimized performance of all the combat system and weaponry suites in order 
to meet the ship’s operational requirements. The combat and weapon system are tested 
using factory acceptance testing (FAT) and are capable of meeting certain performance 
specifications (e.g., accuracy—probability of hit—and range of the gun, probability of 
detection, and tracking by radar/ESM) in specified environment conditions. These 
combat and weapon system are then aligned, installed, and integrated onboard the ship, as 
per suppliers’ installation requirements. After the installation, integration, and check-out 
phase of all individual topside equipment, the vessel has to undergo harbor acceptance 
and an EMI/EMC trial. During the EMI/EMC trial, all the topside equipment is powered 
up, and all the EMI/EMC interaction issues are tested and verified. If during the CDR 
phase, the ITD study is not analyzed accurately and completely, then the performance of 
the topside equipment will not be maximized; and this might cause the vessel to be 
unable to meet its intended overall mission needs. 
The author’s recommendation is as follows: First, the topside designers can 
reference the Topside Design Consideration Checklist shown in Table 9 of Appendix D 
for designing the ship topside during conceptual/preliminary phase. Design assumptions 
and tolerances can be determined. Second, after CDR, the entire topside design must be 
verified using a traceability matrix to ensure that all the topside equipment’s functionality 
and requirements have been fulfilled. Stakeholders must quickly resolve and approve all 
outstanding design issues. 
C. SPIRAL MODEL FOR TOPSIDE DESIGN 
The spiral model for topside design, as shown in Figure 5, is used to serve as 
guidance for topside designers. Topside designers should continuously refer to 
stakeholders’ requirements to design the ship topside. The spiral model shows the key 11 
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topside design consideration branches, starting with EMI. The details of each branch 
translate into the Topside Design Consideration Checklist for the topside designers to 
work with the other disciplines. This spiral process is iterative throughout the design 
phases (e.g., PDR, CDR) and allows for earlier identification of potential problems in 
ship topside design. The process provides topside designers with the flexibility to 
investigate and analyze each individual design. The details of each individual branch are 
further explained in the next section. 
 
Figure 5.  Spiral Model for Topside Design 
  
 
The Topside Design Considerations Checklist is referenced from Bayliss (2003) 
and is further improved by the author. This checklist is not the complete picture of all the 
topside design considerations but is definitely an adequate checklist and a good design 
practice for topside designers to use for conceptual naval ship design.  
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D. TOPSIDE DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Electromagnetic Interference. According to Transport Canada Civil Aviation 
(TCCA), electromagnetic interferences is “the phenomenon occurring when 
electromagnetic energy present in the intended operational environment interacts with the 
electrical or electronic equipment causing unacceptable or undesirable responses, 
malfunctions, interruptions, or degradations in its performance” (Transport Canada Civil 
Aviation [TCCA] 2008, 3). For all ship designs, EMI issues are topside designers’ top 
priority and concern. Interference from one system can cause reduction in sensitivity and 
degradation of performance of another system when the two systems are used 
simultaneously. Backdoor EMI can also occur, where the electric field level generated by 
the source equipment exceeds the specified radiated susceptibility level of victim 
equipment. There is a risk that interference enters the victim equipment via ways other 
than the antenna (e.g., via cable penetrations or cables). This occurs mainly with non-
military equipment, which has a lower susceptibility level than military equipment. In 
serious cases of interference, a non-transmit zone (NTZ) or modifications to the topside 
arrangement or equipment have to be made. All these interferences should be identified 
and recorded in the ITD analysis report. 
In general, the ITD analysis identifies and mitigates the risk of interference and 
radiation hazards. The analysis results in a set of recommendations for (a) placement of 
all topside equipment, (b) NTZ, to prevent illumination of the main mast and radiation 
hazards, (c) blanking, (d) frequency management, (e) modification to the topside 
equipment (e.g., introducing and implementing filters for antennas to mitigate 
interactions); and (f) modifications to the vessel structures, if necessary (e.g., providing 
shielding structure/plates, introducing outriggers to increase antenna separation, being 
away from the walkway, and even reshaping the superstructure). The ITD analysis 
provides guidelines to end users concerning on-board radiation safety in the form of 
radar/antenna safe distance. Lastly, after CDR, there may be events that interference from 
or to the systems topside equipment cannot be resolved by placement, NTZ, blanking, or 
modifications to the vessel structure. Operational procedures for these systems are 
recommended by the topside designers and require approval from stakeholders. 
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For the ITD analysis report, the topside designers start off by collecting all the 
topside equipment specification data, especially the power, polarization, and frequency of 
the radiators, for their detailed analysis. They construct the frequency chart, source-
victim matrix, and summaries in the ITD analysis. The frequency chart displays both 
transmit and receive frequencies of all the topside equipment. The source-victim matrix 
presents the expected level of interaction between each topside equipment pair. Many 
methods (e.g., Methods of Moment [MoMs], Finite Element Methods [FEMs]) analysis 
and software are available for the calculation of these interactions. The source-victim 
matrix interactions range from no interference, to backdoor EMI, to saturation, to damage 
of equipment. ITD analysis also recommends and proposes optimal locations for sensors 
(e.g., navigation radar, surveillance radar) and ESM to maximize the sensors’ coverage, 
preferably a 360° field of view for the vessel. These locations have the least 
blockage/impact of other equipment (e.g., lights, outriggers, antennas) and ship structure. 
This is to optimize installed performance of sensors and their line of sight. 
This thesis does not provide the formulas and calculations for the electromagnetic 
interference analysis. The focus of this thesis is to provide guidelines to topside designers 
regarding topside design considerations checklists to look out for during the design 
phase.  
2. Radiation Hazards (RADHAZ). RADHAZ describes the hazards of 
electromagnetic radiation to personnel (HERP), hazards of electromagnetic radiation to 
fuel (HERF), hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance (HERO), and electronic 
hardware.   
The safety of personnel working near high power transmitters onboard is critical. 
HERP is based on MIL-STD-464 (2010). Topside designers have to calculate the 
minimum safe distance for personnel with respect to all transmitting antennas based on 
the limit values stated in the standard. HERP applies for six minutes on the average and 
usually is calculated using an average transmitter power. Topside designers should ensure 
that there is no radiation hazard to personnel on normally accessible walkways, aircraft 
refueling areas, and RAS areas in the topside design. There should be markings or even 
paint on the topside for end-users to know the minimum safe distance for each 
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transmitter. It is recommended that man-aloft switches be installed before the exits, and 
access points, to areas of transmitters. Areas protected by man-aloft switches would then 
be inherently safe with respect to the transmitters. 
HERO is also based to MIL-STD-464 (2010). Topside designers should 
recommend to stakeholders that the chosen ordnance at least meet the MIL-STD-464 
limit values. These values are the frequency-dependent minimum electric field values that 
the ordnance must be able to withstand. Most of the ordnance is able to withstand high 
electric field strength. In the event that the calculated electric field is higher than the 
ordnance-specific limits related to radiation hazards, repositioning the antenna is 
recommended. Topside designers should ensure that the designed/purchased ammunition 
lockers are metallic enclosures and that they are fitted with doors providing good 
isolation against an external electromagnetic environment. Operational procedures are 
recommended when handling the ammunition (e.g., nearby HF antennas should not be 
transmitting and should be switched off during the loading of ammunition). 
HERF is based on the MIL-STD-464 (2010). The electric field strength at 
refueling points for the ship and aviation, RAS, VERTREP, and boat area are calculated 
and verified to be below the standard limit. The movement of fuel, stores, ammunition, 
and people must all be accounted for in the topside design. Not only are the keep-clear 
zones identified for RAS stations, but also the movement of the stores over the topside 
(usually by man or by small pallet vehicles) to the designated location on the ship must 
be considered. 
Lastly, the transmissions of ship transmitters, especially the transmitting radars, 
may influence a helicopter on the helicopter deck or near the vessel. Topside designers 
should check that the end-user helicopter is compliant with MIL-STD-461, and also that 
the minimum safe distance from the transmitter to helicopter using peak transmit power 
is calculated. A detailed analysis regarding the helicopter approach and the choice of 
radar, together with operational procedures, should be carried out. 
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3. Weapon Integration. This subsection is divided in two: first, guns; second, 
missiles. They share some similarities in terms of topside design considerations (e.g., 
interaction with other projectiles) and the Blocking Assessment Model (BAM).  
For the interaction with other projectiles, topside designers have to take note that 
the firing cones for the missiles/weapons do not overlap and thus pose no risk of 
ammunition collision. The design margin is included, and the repositioning of the 
weapons is recommended. 
The BAM optical coverage plot provides a quick-check, line-of-sight view from 
the perspective of the antenna and weapon. In general, the BAM plot covers the full 360° 
in azimuth and below zero (horizon) to 90° in elevation. The topside designer will want 
to know how blockage from other systems and structure affect the antenna and weapon 
view. The topside designer can understand the combined field of view for the antenna 
and weapon in terms of bearings for all positive elevations from BAM. This will help the 
designer fine tune and optimize the location of antennas and weapons to obtain a broader 
firing arc for the weapon.  
For gun topside design considerations, the top priority is weapon safety, followed 
by weapon coverage or arc of firing in terms of elevation and azimuth. There are 
mechanical/safety buffer stops designed for the guns to prevent them from firing towards 
the superstructure. The recommended weapon coverage is 360° for combined guns to 
provide protection and survivability for the vessel. The recommended surveillance radar 
coverage is also 360° to match with the guns’ coverage. There may be requests from the 
end user to have depressed firing for the guns, especially for the ATTD, to tackle nearby 
firing. Using 3D modeling and gun installation requirements information, topside 
designers can determine the clearance space required. The other main design 
considerations are the blast pressure from the guns, which will affect the surrounding 
systems and equipment. If a system (e.g., communication or lighting equipment) is 
required to be placed near the vicinity of the guns, protection cases, shock mounts and 
militarized equipment are recommended. Blast Panels (port and starboard [stbd]) are 
recommended to be incorporated for the gun bay design for handling compartment 
overpressure. Firing the guns generates a lot of smoke content. It is advisable to place 
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ventilation inlets and exhaust outlets away from the guns. For the gun foundation design, 
there are foundation frequency requirements. There is an increasing trend in the design of 
the main gun foundation to be integrated with the breakwater. It is V-shaped and facing 
forward, followed by a rectangular basin. The basin can also be used as a spent-case-
ejection area. Topside designers should also take note of the gun maintenance required 
area (e.g., barrel swabbing area), which requires significant length. Beside the 
maintenance, the designs should also incorporate a sufficient ammo loading and handling 
area.  
For the missile topside design considerations, the top priority is ammo safety. If 
missile launchers are placed near transmitters, especially high-powered HF transmitters, 
then the topside designer should first ensure that the electric field strength generated by 
the transmitter at the missile area remains lower than the missile susceptibility level. 
Next, recommendations (e.g., antenna blanking) should apply during missile launch so 
there will be no radiation hazards to a launched missile from onboard transmitters. Next, 
topside designers have to understand the firing clearance zones and debris ejection zones 
required and ensure that there is no blockage from the topside equipment/superstructure. 
Missile installation and embarkation space should be catered. Topside designers have to 
understand the missile efflux temperature and overpressure profile and thus ensure that 
the topside design is able to handle the high temperature and pressure to protect the ship 
structure and equipment (e.g., insert blast deflectors or open up ship-side openings for 
firing of missiles). There should be accessibility, concerning the loading and maintenance 
of the launcher. Firing missiles generates a lot of toxic gases, so it is advisable to place 
ventilation inlets and exhaust outlets away from the missiles. There is a high requirement 
for structural and foundational rigidity to meet missile installation. Last, a firefighting 
system should be installed for fire protection during the firing of a missile.  
4. System Operation and Maintenance Space. As more ship designs are trending 
toward an integrated mast, arrangements for operation, maintenance, and access have to 
be taken into consideration. Topside designers should focus on the system installation 
requirements (e.g., embarkation route for the equipment, maintenance space, operating 
space, power, cooling, and safety requirements) of the system. They should consider 
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incorporating access to maintain/repair antennas, navigation lights, and other equipment 
fitted on the yard arms in their design. Using 3D modeling, the physical integration and 
checks of antennas with the structure should be considered to ensure that the operational 
movement of an antenna does not clash with the structure. Human factor ergonomics 
requirements should be considered and incorporated in the ship topside design. 
5. Scenario Modeling (Range-to-Target Model). During the development of a 
preliminary topside layout of a naval ship, alternative solutions should be evaluated 
against a scenario devised by the topside designer to inform and select the choice of 
payload configurations to meet the MOEs. It is possible to evaluate the design and obtain 
a comparative measure of how each solution would perform against a proposed threat 
scenario. Using probabilities of survivability of the vessel, it is possible to analyze a 
particular set of payload configurations against different attack/defense scenarios. This 
thesis uses the NPS Range-to-Target Model and back of envelope (BOE) for scenario 
modeling. This analysis requires parameters (e.g., the speed of the attacking/defensive 
missiles, the probability of kills from missiles/main gun, and the detection range of 
sensors). Further details are explained in Chapter V.  
6. Structural Analysis. The ship topside structures (e.g., mast, deckhouse, 
platform) require continuous structural re-assessment for the introduction and/or removal 
of systems/equipment topside. The choices of material available for superstructure are 
mild steel, aluminum, and composite. There are advantages (e.g., high strength for steel) 
and disadvantages (e.g., less fire resistant for aluminum) for each material. Finite element 
analysis (FEA) modeling is required to understand the natural frequency stresses 
imparted in topside structures from design pressure. The mast frequencies should lie 
outside a +/- 20% band of significant excitation frequencies (e.g., main machinery and 
ship motions; Savage and Kimber 2010). Structural designers should analyze shock and 
vibration of the superstructure as part of the overall design of the ship. The topside and 
structural designers should analyze the pressure exerted on the superstructure during 
main gun firing. Software modeling and calculations can be first made during the design 
phase, and structural test firing checked during live fire trials. Last, there is also an 
increased interest in the protection/armor of the topside superstructure to reduce the 
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vulnerability of the ship. Modular armor plates are inserted at critical areas of the topside 
of the ship. There is research into ballistic protection technology (e.g., lightweight 
material for armor protection), which should facilitate the ease of implementation. 
Coating technology can also be applied to the surface of the mast/bridge/funnel structure 
to improve blast and fragmentation protection. 
7. Air Resistance and Air Wake. Reshaping and resizing optimization of the 
mast/funnel on topside should be carried out to improve ship speed and movement. Air 
Flow analysis through the topside (mast) has also taken on increasing significance due to 
volume, temperature, and particulates from the exhaust into the topside and flight deck 
area. Wind tunnel test and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) software modeling can 
simulate various ship speeds and movements to understand the air flow so that the 
designers can better optimize the topside design. The size of the mast (slimmer mast) and 
funnel shape should be optimized for improved laminar air flow. There can be a 
significant increase in pilot workload due to the effect of laminar flow from the 
superstructure of the ship when he is trying to land his helicopter on the flight deck. 
Turbulence can affect the safety and operation of the helicopter (Savage and Kimber 
2010). 
8. Exhaust Plume. The toxic gas and high temperatures generated around the 
funnel are safety concerns to topside designers. Topside designers should note that the 
hot exhaust plume affects the antenna performance and so reposition the equipment away 
from the funnels. Several recommendations can be made, including reshaping the funnel, 
raising the height, and inserting expensive diffusers to reduce the amount of toxic gas 
flowing to the flight deck. 
9. Flight Deck. The design of the flight deck depends heavily on the type of 
aircraft to be placed onboard, and also on the mission modules to be deployed. There are 
many design considerations for the flight deck: 
• Operations of the helicopter, such as normal landing(aft/port), taking off, 
and emergency landing 
• Operations of modular mission modules, such as deployment space, and 
securing of mission modules 
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• Operations of the personnel on flight deck, such as pilots, maintainers, and 
operators for either the helicopter or mission modules 
• VERTREP operations 
• Flight deck dimensions to suit all the above operations  
• Flight deck safety net and deck marking 
• Flight deck communications  
• Flight deck drainage  
• Water and gas refueling to hangar and flight deck  
• Heli Visual Aids System (HELIVAS) 
• Aircraft/helicopter and hangar securing system, such as the Aircraft Ship 
Integrated Secure and Traverse (ASIST) System 
• Fire-fighting facilities 
• Stowage facilities, such as aviation ammo storage and mission modules 
The challenge for topside designers is not about just designing the flight deck 
based on these many inputs and considerations. They must also consider the other topside 
equipment working simultaneously and their impacts on the flight deck operation (e.g., 
will the transmitters affect the operation of the mission module?). At times, topside 
designers must also propose and present various combinations of operations that can be 
performed simultaneously on the flight deck and topside to the end-users. 
10. Boat Operations. Boats of various kinds, including unmanned surface vehicles 
(USVs) must be deployed and recovered from off or through the topside. The deployment 
concepts for boats become uniquely assessed for each ship class, and the utility of 
deployment and recovery simulation are becoming very important to topside designers. 
One of the key topside considerations is the required boat davit crane operation clearance 
area. 3D modeling is recommended to simulate the movement of the crane, deployment, 
and recovery of boat/USV for integration checks. 
11. Signature Control. The objective of signature control is to influence the 
onboard hit point location by reducing the susceptibility of the ship and as a result 
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increase its overall survivability. Shaping of the superstructure radiation improves the 
radar cross section (RCS) of the ship by deflecting the radiation emitted by the ship and 
not reflecting it back to the enemy’s receivers. Radar absorbent material (RAM) helps 
absorb radiation emitted by the ship and reduces the radiation that the enemy receives. 
Innovative designs, such as a retractable integrated mast, are applied to reduce the RCS 
of the ship.  
A hull cooling system is a cost-effective solution that uses seawater cooling to 
generate a water curtain to reduce infrared radiation emitted by the ship. Topside 
designers have to take note that the disadvantage of this hull cooling system is high wind, 
which can break the water curtain and make the ship detectable. Second, installing this 
system is not practical for covering the high mast. Third, the water screen masks a ship’s 
own sensors. Another method is to apply low solar absorbance paint on the ship hull. One 
of the high infrared-red zones of the ship is the ship funnel; good heat insulation material 
can be used for the construction of the funnel. 
There are other signature reduction control considerations (e.g., acoustic and 
magnetic). There are methods such as hull coating and machinery isolation to reduce the 
acoustic signature, and advanced degaussing to reduce the magnetic signature of the ship. 
In summary, the reason for explaining the above 11 branches of the topside 
considerations is for topside designers to take note that, during the design phase, they 
might be so focused on one branch, such as optimizing the RCS for the superstructure or 
the placement of topside equipment, that they forget to check the interactions between the 
design branches and nearby topside systems. For example, the topside designer may 
propose a certain paint coating technology that is suitable for signature control, but he or 
she may miss out on the interaction of high temperature and pressure of the missile efflux 
on the paint coating. A topside designer not only has to look at the details of the design 
branches, but also needs to zoom out to see the big picture, including mission 
requirements and other interactions between systems to ensure a good topside design 
meet the MOEs. 
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E. TOPSIDE SIZING MODEL 
The Topside Sizing Model is a heuristic design model based on rules of thumb 
and design experience. Heuristics work best when applied early to reduce the solution 
space (Maier and Rechtin 2002). The main objective of TSM is to explore the design 
space and allow for divergent thinking to generate more choices. There are a few design 
alternatives for the superstructure. The first design of a vessel has only one main block 
connected to the hangar block. The second design is one fwd block and one aft block 
connected to the hangar block. The aft block can be used for an aft stacked mast/funnel. 
The third design is one fwd block, one center block, and one hangar block with an aft 
stacked mast on top. TSM starts by initiating simple sizing for the superstructure 
block/blocks and trying to come out with a conceptual ship design. Next, TSM assists the 
ship designers in initial placement of all the major topside equipment with topside design 
considerations.  
After sizing the superstructure and placement of topside equipment, the last space 
criteria condition has to be fulfilled. The superstructure, the topside equipment, and its 
additional required space must be lesser than the calculated length of the vessel 
previously derived from the Numerical Warship Design Procedure. These additional 
required spaces shall be catered for the various reasons:  
• Sufficient space for adequate arcs of coverage for weapon and sensor suite  
• Sufficient clearance space for blast pressure  
• Sufficient clearance space for high temperature/plume  
• Sufficient separation between radiating antennas  
• Sufficient clearance space for helicopter for safe takeoff 
• Sufficient operating envelopes of the ship crane 
• Sufficient ammo loading and unloading for weapons and decoy 
• Sufficient space for operation and maintenance of topside equipment 
• Sufficient space for safety reasons 
• Sufficient space for RADHAZ considerations 
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This issue was also highlighted in the description of the NFR 90 design (Schaffer 
and Kloehn 1991) where the length of 133 meters is a direct result of the spacing required 
on the topside. TSM does not optimize the length of the vessel but designs the initial 
topside layout and provides a feasibility physical check to ensure the topside equipment 
fits into the overall calculated length of vessel.  
The designer has to understand and check the interactions and behaviors of the 
system and its surrounding systems because its performance may be impacted by and 
have an effect on the surrounding systems. Additional interaction space also needs to be 
provided. One example is the interaction of the SAM/SSM/Decoy systems near high 
radiating antenna. 
If the space criteria is not fulfilled (e.g., if the length and beam is insufficient for 
the payload and superstructure layout), then there are three available options, as shown in 
Figure 6, for the designer to choose from in order to find a satisfactory conceptual ship 
design. The first option is to change the type and model of payload (e.g., find a smaller 
size payload). The second option is to change the payload space margin in the Numerical 
Warship Design Procedure. The third option is to change the design parameters with 
respect to (1) length proportion for front part of the ship forecastle, (2) length proportion 
for the superstructure block/blocks, or (3) length proportion of the hangar block 
For this thesis, TSM is conducted within an Excel Model and is added on to the 
UCL Numerical Warship Design Procedure. The desired outcome is a satisfactory 
conceptual ship design. This model can also be added to the MIT Simplified Math Model 
for the Design of Naval Frigates. 
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IV. DESIGN PHASE 
A. OVERVIEW 
The objective of this chapter is to develop and use the design methodology as 
displayed in Figure 6, which incorporates naval architecture and topside design 
considerations to design and come out with satisfactory conceptual frigate designs. The 
design of ship size has to meet the stakeholders’ requirements, which are to fulfill the 
certain operational requirements of the vessel. The design of the ship size depends 
heavily on the payload configuration chosen onboard. Each payload has its own topside 
design considerations, thus affecting the overall dimensions of the vessel.  
For example, in terms of anti-piracy or exclusive economic zone (EEZ) missions, 
the vessel has to achieve certain speed and range. It is required to be equipped with a 
surveillance radar to track its target and to be armed with armament, such as 76/30mm 
gun. It may also have helicopter/UAV capabilities to assist in its mission. The vessel has 
to be mission effective and perform its functions. Various system configurations are 
taken into account before the final decisions are made. 
The design methodology consists of two phases. Phase 1 is to apply the UCL 
Numerical Warship Design Process (UCL, 1997) to derive the size, weight, and volume 
of the ship. The length, beam, and draft are obtained through iterations in order for the 
design to be balanced. The payload volume and weight data may be obtained from the 
existing database or is provided by the system suppliers. Main ship dimensions decide 
many of the ship characteristics for example stability, hold capacity, power requirement, 
and even economic efficiency.  
Phase 2, the Topside Sizing Model, starts once the design is balanced, ship 
dimensions are obtained, assumptions are made, and design parameters are inserted. The 
main purpose of this phase is to check whether the initial length and beam is sufficient to 
have an acceptable topside design after all the topside equipment being placed in the 
design. If there is insufficient length or beam, the design needs to be iterated using the 
three options, as stated in Chapter III. 
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B. BACKGROUND RESEARCH 
A study was carried out on nine popular frigate designs, such as La Fayette 
(France), Valour (South Africa), and Sachsen Class (Germany) to understand their design 
parameters, especially with respect to the length displacement ratio and beam draft ratio. 
The results are shown in Appendix E. The findings for the length displacement ratio 
averages 3.34, at while the beam draft ratio averages at 7.32. This is comparable to the 
values used in the UCL Numerical Warship Design Procedure.  
The second purpose is to understand the topside layout and commonality of these 
ten frigates. The findings for the commonality in these ship designs consist of forward 
block (inclusive of forward stacked mast), aft block (can be either used for aft stacked 
mast or funnel), and hangar block. This type of layout design with forward and aft block 
has several advantages. First, it improves EMI/EMC by allowing greater antenna 
separation. Second, it increases survivability and is better able handle threats and allow 
for design redundancy. 
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C. NUMERICAL WARSHIP DESIGN PROCEDURE 
The payload configuration of the multi-role stealth frigate includes the baseline 
payload configuration, main sensors (ESM), surveillance radar and FCR, weaponry 
(SAM, SSM, main gun, and ATTD), countermeasures, aviation capacity (helicopter), and 
mission modules (UAV, USV, and unmanned underwater vehicle [UUV]). This payload 
configuration is selected to meet functional requirements and missions capabilities, as 
stated by stakeholders. The Numerical Warship Design Procedure is conducted within an 
Excel model. 
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The parameters used for the Numerical Warship Design Procedure (UCL, 1997) 
are as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Parameters Used in the Numerical Warship Design Procedure  
Payload Volume Fraction 0.2 
 Length Displacement Ratio 7.5 
 Beam Draft Ratio 3.25 
 Block Coefficient 0.5 
 Waterplane Coefficient 0.75 
 Deck Head Height 3 m 
Scaling Factor for Length 15% 
 Scaling Factor for Beam 14% 
    
From University College of London (UCL), Naval Architecture M.Sc Ship Design 
Procedure and Data Book, London: Naval Architecture Research Group, Department of 
Mechanical, University College London, 1997. 
The design is balanced on two conditions:  
Displacement = Weight of the groups  
Volume available in the hull ≥ volume required by the groups  
Based on the baseline payload configuration shown in Table 8 of Appendix C, 
and after seven iterations as shown in Figure 7, the results are as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3.   Results of Baseline Configuration 
Total Payload Weight 137.7 tonnes 
Total Payload Volume 2670 m3 
Ship Weight 3740 tonnes 
Ship Volume 12204 m3 
Waterline Length 
(LWL)  110.2 m 
Length Overall (LOA) 126.7 m 
Beam Overall (BOA) 15.6 m 
Draft 4.21 m 
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Figure 7.  Design Methodology for Conceptual Ship Design 
 
 
After phase 1 is completed (the design is balanced), several parameters (such as 
length, beam, and draft) of the ship are obtained. The dimension of a ship should be 
coordinated such that the ship satisfies the design conditions. The ship should not be 
designed larger than truly required or necessary. The main reasons are wastage, low 
speed, increased power requirements, and increased cost. 
D. TOPSIDE SIZING MODEL ANALYSIS 
In phase 2, several assumptions are made in the Topside Sizing Model: 
1. The hull form of the frigate is based on a monohull design. The 
stakeholders’ preference for the superstructure design is to have one fwd 
block, one aft block connected to the hangar block for better EMI/EMC 
performance, and higher survivability. The main gun (center [C]), decoys 
(port/stbd), one ATTD(C), and SAM(C) is preferably installed in front of 
the fwd block. SSM (one facing port and one facing stbd) and torpedo 
launcher (port/stbd) is installed between fwd and aft block. A helicopter 
can be secured on the helideck or stored inside the hangar. 
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2. The usable space at the front of the ship for topside equipment is limited 
especially for the main gun on deck and gunbay (1st deck). Based on 
frigate design examples, as shown in Appendix E, the unusable space is 
approximated 0.050–0.080 proportion of the LOA. 
3. Beside the actual equipment space, there is a need for additional required 
space by the payload to be catered (e.g., operation, maintenance, blast 
zone, clearance zone, firing angle, ammunition loading of equipment, 
safety requirement, RADHAZ, and class rules). These additional required 
spaces can be inferred from data inside the equipment installation 
document and through design experience.  
4. Based on the frigate design examples shown in Appendix E, the fwd block 
length is approximated 0.12–0.17 of LOA, and aft block length is 
approximated 0.09–0.13 of LOA. 
5. There shall be one hangar designed for storing the helicopter. 
Sensitivity analysis can be applied to TSM in terms of varying the length 
proportion for each superstructure block and hangar block to generate more and practical 
superstructure designs. The result shows that the frigate of a ship design in Figure 24, 
with its baseline payload configuration as shown in Table 8 of Appendix C, is able to 
meet TSM space criteria with the design parameters as shown in Tables 10 and 11 of 
Appendix F. The results also show a 6.92m buffer length, which can be used for a 
superstructure block size upgrade, placement of more topside equipment, and future 
growth purposes. The sensitivity results of other alternative designs are shown in 
Appendix H. 
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V. COST-CAPABILITY ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND 
Cost-capability analysis (Boensel 2015) is applied to examine the trade-off in the 
capability of a system versus the vessel cost of procurement. Its objective is to 
recommend to the stakeholders a certain size of frigate with the type of payload 
configuration that fulfills their effective needs and meets the MOE. However, given the 
size of the naval fleet and the budget constraints, this has to be done cost effectively. The 
intent of this analysis is to identify the most cost-effective way to improve the defensive 
capability of naval fleets against swarm missile/UAV attacks. An improvement, such as 
upgraded missile guidance systems or the addition of an ATTD, would enhance the ships 
ability to defend and engage the swarm missiles/UAVs. An overview of the cost-
capability analysis is displayed in Figure 8.  





Back Of the 
Envelope(BOE) 
Model









B. COST-CAPABILITY MODELS ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The capability analysis starts off with the scenario-settings specification, as listed 
in Appendix A. The analysis is then followed by the range-to-target model (Boensel 
2015) and back of envelope (BOE) model analysis (Boensel 2015) using an Excel model. 
The BOE analysis provides efficient and fast validation and verification of results. The 
BOE fleet defense model is a stochastic model for the operational scenario.  
1. Range-to-Target Model 
The purpose of the range-to-target model is to determine the maximum number of 
missiles that could be fired from each ship at the incoming RedFire missiles. The range-
to-target graph (BlueIntercept vs. RedFire) was generated to show the relationship 
between detection range, time between launches, missile range, and minimum and 
maximum interception range at various distances and interception times, as displayed in 
Figure 9. 
Figure 9.  Range-to-Target Plot (BlueIntercept Missile vs. RedFire)  
 
 
As shown in Figure 9, there is a range gap of 30 kyds between missile 
interception capability and sensor detection capability. Because the missile interception 
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range is not fully utilized, the time to react to incoming threats is limited by its detection 
range. Coupled with launcher process time and time between launches, this results in 
only 24 BlueIntercept missile launches within the time window of 75s from detection of 
incoming missiles. The earliest first launch was at 127s after first detection at 123s.  
𝑡𝑡0 = (𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟−𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣 = 100−420.47 = 123𝑠𝑠    (1) 
The above reasons contribute to a high number of frigates and AWS not able to defend 
themselves against incoming threats and being sunk. 
The range-to-target graph (main gun vs. BlueIntercept Leakers) was generated to 
show the relationship of ATTD engagement range (16 kyds) and time between main gun 
intercepts and missile range, Figure 10. From this graph, it can be seen that the main gun 
system of a frigate has only twelve chances of engagement before the RedFire missile 
hits the ship. 
The range-to-target graph (ATTD vs. BlueIntercept Leakers) was generated to show 
the relationship of ATTD engagement range (3 kyds) and time between ATTD intercepts 
and missile range, Figure 11. From this graph, it can be seen that the ATTD has only 
three chances of engagement before the RedFire missile hits the ship. 
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Figure 10.  Range-to-Target Plot (Main Gun System vs. RedFire) 
 
Figure 11.    Range-to-Target Plot (ATTD System vs. RedFire) 
 
 
Max Main Gun Range 
Max ATTD Range 
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2. Back of Envelope Model 
The BOE model (Boensel 2015) was created with the following engagement 
assumptions: 
• The navy fleet (frigate and AWS) is treated as a point target. 
• At one time, the incoming RedFire missiles should be treated as one batch 
of 200 missiles and not sequential. The ship can detect and track up to 250 
RedFire missiles simultaneously.  
• Given the high number of incoming RedFire missiles, one ATTD gun is 
fired at one target each time to increase the overall number of missile 
engagements.  
• Unlike BlueIntercept missiles, which can engage any missiles that are 
detected, the ATTD can only be employed to engage targets that are 
directed towards the ship on which the ATTD system is deployed (i.e., 
ATTD on one frigate cannot be used to engage targets that are directed 
towards another frigate or AWS).    
The BOE models were created using the attributes of the defense capabilities listed in 
Appendix A, and the results are shown below.  
For scenario 1, results from the range-to-target analysis suggest that only 24 
BlueIntercept missiles can be launched from the single frigate within the interception 
window. The BlueIntercept missiles (first-layer defense) of the frigate is capable of 
intercepting approximately 17 missiles, while the main gun (second-layer defense) hit 
approximately five missiles. The countermeasure is activated and able to attract four 
missiles, while the ATTD is able to hit approximately two missiles. The statistical data 
generated showed a probability of 0.382 in sinking the frigate by a salvo of 50 RedFire 
incoming missiles from first 500 simulation runs.  
For scenario 2, results from the range-to-target analysis suggest that only 24 
BlueIntercept missiles can be launched from each frigate within the interception window. 
Thus, a total of approximately 122 BlueIntercept missiles are fired from the frigates to 
counter the salvo of 200 RedFire missiles. An approximated 85 RedFire missiles are 
intercepted, but around 69 leakers fly towards the AWS and 46 leakers target the frigates. 
The number of BlueIntercept missiles fired is limited by detection range, the time interval 
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between launches, and the speed of its missiles. The statistical data generated from first 
500 simulation runs showed a survivability of 79.6% for the five frigates and a 
survivability of 14.9% for the four AWS. In the case of 50 incoming RedFire missiles, as 
shown in Figure 12, none of the RedFire missiles is expected to breach the fleet defense. 
If there are more than 85 incoming RedFire missiles, then there will be at least one AWS 
sunk. If there are more than 100 incoming RedFire, then there will be at least one frigate 
sunk. Hence, the current fleet AAW capability with the baseline configuration is capable 
of defending against approximately 80 incoming RedFire missiles, and no ships are sunk.   
Figure 12.  Probability of Survivability of Fleet (5 Frigate + 4 AWS) vs. No 
Incoming RedFire Missiles 
 
 
Overall, the results from the two scenarios above illustrate that the current fleet 
AAW payload configuration is insufficient to provide adequate air defense for frigates 
and AWS in an operational scenario.  
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3. Design of the Experiments Model 
In order to determine the cost-effective set of improvements to either the sensors, 
BlueIntercept missiles, main gun, countermeasures, or the ATTD, a design of 
experiments (DOE) is used. A DOE serves as the primary tool to identify and shortlist the 
parameters that yield the best possible outcomes in meeting the objectives. The purpose 
of a DOE is to investigate and identify possible parameter changes that will significantly 
improve the outcome (i.e., reduce the chance of the frigate and AWS being sunk).  
Minitab software is used to generate a series of combinations for input to the DOE 
model. The output from the number of frigates and AWS sunk for each combination is 
used on Minitab to process and generate the interactions of the parameters/factors with 
the outcome. Using Minitab, factorial analysis was performed to determine the impact of 
the various defense attributes on the performance of the overall defense (average number 
of leakers that target the AWSs per run). This allowed for the identification of attributes 
that have higher leverage on performance. The series of combination of inputs and 
outputs for the two scenarios are displayed in Tables 12 and 13 of Appendix G. For 
scenario 1, the results of the factorial analysis are captured in the main effects plot in 
Figure 13 and pareto plot in Figure 14. For scenario 2, the results of the factorial analysis 
are captured in the main effects plot in Figure 15 and pareto plot in Figure 16. The design 
parameters are 1/32 fraction, 64 runs, and resolution V 2^(11-5) . 
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Figure 13.  Main Effects Plot for 11 Parameters (Scenario 1) 
 
Figure 14.  Pareto Plot for 11 Parameters (Scenario 1) 
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Figure 15.  Main Effects Plot for 11 Parameters (Scenario 2) 
 
Figure 16.  Pareto Plot for 11 Parameters (Scenario 2) 
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The degree of contribution by each of the attributes in a Main Effects Plot is 
indicated by its slope; the steeper the slope, the greater the contribution to the 
performance. A comparison check for the significant attributes between the single and 
escort scenario is performed. A summary table of common higher significant attributes 
for sensitivity analysis is displayed in Table 4.  
Table 4.   Summary of Attributes for Consideration 
Attributes Rank 
BI P(Kill) 1 
RCS 2 
Main Gun P(Kill) 3 
ATTD P(Kill) 4 
ATTD Range 5 
Decoy P(Kill) 6 
Detection Range 7 
Launch Interval 8 
 
The main effects plots and pareto plot showed that both BI P(Kill) and RCS have 
the most significant impact on the frigate sunk, followed by main gun P(Kill) and ATTD 
P(Kill). This goes well with the BOE analysis, which suggests that if the probability of 
kill by the BlueIntercept missiles is enhanced, then more BlueIntercept missiles can be 
fired to intercept the RedFire missiles, thus enhancing the survivability of the AWS ship. 
4. Sensitivity Analysis 
Following the DOE analysis, a sensitivity analysis of the parameters with higher 
significance was performed. There is better granularity in parameter settings obtained 
from the DOE, and this will provide finer resolution on the outcome effects, which are 
the survivability of the frigate and AWS. This process facilitates the stakeholders in their 
final decision making on the optimal cost-effective solution. 
The sensitivity analysis is done incrementally based on the matrix, as displayed in 
the Table 5. A total of 41 options are generated, and these options provide different 
upgrade combinations, each with varying levels of performance. The specific upgrades 
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and the exact performance for each of these options and parameters used, as shown in 
Table 14, are captured in Appendix H. It should be noted that these options were 
conceived based on the following assumptions: 
a. The missile inventory of each frigate cannot be increased further, leaving a 
maximum of 32 missiles per frigate. 
b. The probability of BlueIntercept missiles can be improved though acquiring a 
more advanced missile system that has better guidance, propulsion system, 
and control mechanisms. 
c. RCS can be improved by shaping the superstructure and adopting an RCS 
design approach for the vessel. 
d. Main gun P(Kill) can be improved through bigger caliber, smart ammunition, 
and turrets. 
e. The probability of ATTD intercept and range can be improved through barrel 
size, rate of firing, smart ammunition, and radar tracking. 
f. Decoy P(Kill) can be improved in software algorithm, ammunition type, and 
the number of rounds. 
g. Sensor detection range can be improved by upgrading and using better radar 
technology. Upgrading can be related to replacement with more powerful and 
larger transceivers. 
h. The launch-time interval is affected by the Combat Management System 
(CMS) and Missile Launch System (MLS). These can be improved by 
upgrading or changing the MLS electronics and CMS electronics. 
However, the stakeholders and designers need to keep in mind that any upgrades 
to the payload configuration will result in a larger ship, higher weight, and higher cost to 
the overall ship weight budget and cost calculation.  
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Table 5.   Matrix for Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
From the results obtained in Table 15 of Appendix H, in order to achieve both the 
MOE, which is 90% confidence of a more than 99% chance of surviving for the frigates, 
and 90% confidence of a more than 99% chance of surviving for the AWS from a salvo 
of 200 RedFire Missiles fired to have simultaneous arrival in the vicinity of the ships, 
only Options 20, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 41 would meet this requirement.  





















Option 9 x x
Option 10 x x
Option 11 x x
Option 12 x x x
Option 13 x x x
Option 14 x x x
Option 15 x x x x
Option 16 x x x x
Option 17 x x x x x
Option 18 x x x x x x
Option 19 x x x x x x x
Option 20 x x x x
Option 21 x x x
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5. Cost-Effectiveness Plot 
The assessment of the analysis is completed with cost-effectiveness 
considerations. This is to obtain the most cost-effective way to improve the overall 
capability of the frigate. Using the results in Table 16 of Appendix I, a cost-effectiveness 
plot, as shown in Figure 17, was constructed to evaluate the cost-effectiveness. 
Figure 17.  Cost-Effectiveness Plot 
 
 
From the plot, Option 34, the baseline payload configuration with the only an 
upgrade to surveillance radar model 2 (higher sensor detection range) and to ATTD 
model 3 (higher probability of kill at 0.8 and range at 12 kyds), is the recommended 
solution. This option fulfilled the MOEs at the lowest cost of $618.925M per frigate. At 
times, the recommended solution may not be available due to technology constraints, if 
the electronic system or weaponry is unavailable for sale, for export reasons, or for 
political reasons. Thus, the cost-effectiveness plot is useful in the sense that it also 
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provides to the stakeholders the other available options that meet all the MOEs, but at a 
higher price. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
At times during designing naval ships, ship designers lose sight of the overall big 
picture, functionalities, and the mission needs of the vessel. Moreover, naval architects 
concentrate on the speed, range, and displacement and ship stability calculation. Topside 
designers are more concerned with the placement, feasibility checks, and optimization of 
the location of both the topside combat systems and platform systems. Ship designers are 
designing in “silos,” and thus the design of the ship is not well integrated. At the 
conceptual and tender phase, ship designers can apply a systems engineering approach 
for the preliminary design of a frigate. Ship designers can be brought together to 
understand the big picture and work towards a common set of functions and 
requirements. They are able to apply Numerical Warship Design Procedure together with 
the Topside Sizing Model to quickly determine the ship’s parameters and achieve 
satisfactory conceptual ship designs. Of course, the overall design of the ship will still 
need to look into other analyses (e.g., stability, speed, and power analyses). 
The synthesis process continues to find alternative solutions and finally derive a 
cost-effective design solution. From the results of the BOE simulation, it can be seen that 
the existing defense payload configuration is insufficient to protect the five frigates and 
four AWS from a swarm of 200 missiles. The design of experiments results suggests that 
the kill probability of the BlueIntercept missile and RCS have a significant impact in 
defending and protecting the frigates and AWS in surviving the swarm attack of the 
RedFire missiles. After examining the cost-effectiveness plot, several viable options are 
generated. It is recommended that the detection range of surveillance radar and the ATTD 
be upgraded. This would enable the fleet to survive the swarm of RedFire missile attacks. 
Hence, this simulation result would allow the defending fleet to design its payload 
configuration to handle such threats.   
The recommendations are for further enhancements that can be added in the 
topside sizing model to look into sizing of the height of the superstructure. This will 
provide more details to the topside consideration studies and overall shaping of the 
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superstructure. If time and budget permits, the overall ship design should include the 
detailed internal layout for feasibility check and a preliminary EMI/EMC analysis study.  
As for the cost-capability analysis, more scenarios and modeling can be 
performed to ensure a more robust solution (e.g., an offense scenario for the fleet of 
frigates in littoral environment). Secondly, more MOEs, such as radar detection 
capability, lethality of the missiles and ammo, and first strike capability, can be added to 




APPENDIX A.  SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT  
The scenario settings are referenced from NPS Capability Engineering. The two 
scenario settings identified for this thesis are as follows: 
1) Swarm missile attack versus single frigate 
2) Escort mission (swarm missile attack versus a force of four amphibious warfare 
ships [AWS] and five frigates) 
Scenario 1. Details of the first scenario setting (swarm missile attack versus 
single frigate) are as shown here: 
A frigate is attacked by a near-simultaneous launch of 50 surface-skimming, anti-
ship cruise missiles.   
The incoming missiles (RedFire) can be detected by a ship’s surveillance radar at 
a maximum range of 42 kyds. The time to detect and classify a target for the expected sea 
state is lognormally distributed with a mean of 4 seconds and a standard deviation of 2 
seconds. The frigate has a combat management system and can simultaneously track and 
classify up to 50 incoming missiles. 
The frigate is armed with BlueIntercept (BI) surface-to-air  missiles (SAM; model 
1). They are fired sequentially at a minimum interval of 3 seconds per missile. The 
BlueIntercept missiles fly at a speed of 1.1 kyds per second. Each BlueIntercept missile 
has a 0.70 probability of kill against a RedFire missile. The BlueIntercept missile has a 
maximum range of 72 kyds and a minimum range of 5 kyds (engagement inside 5 kyds is 
not possible due to safety stand-off). 
The frigate is armed with 32 BlueIntercept missiles. 
The RedFire missile flies at about Mach 1.25 (standard day, about 0.47 kyds per 
second) and is launched from a point at least 100 kyds from the frigate 
Each RedFire has a probability of hitting one of the ships at the force of 0.80, and, 
given a hit, a probability of sinking the frigate = 0.30 
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The RedFire missile uses a radar-seeker head and has a high probability 0.90 of 
hitting a larger target with a large RCS. A reduction in RCS of the frigate will result in a 
lower probability of being detected and hit. 
If a RedFire closes within 16 kyds of frigate, then it can also be engaged by the 
ship’s main gun system (model 1). The ship’s main gun system has a 0.4 probability of 
killing an inbound RedFire. There is one main gun per frigate in the force. The total time 
for a full main gun engagement is 3 seconds (acquire, track, fire).   
If RedFire closes within 10 kyds of the frigate, then the decoy rounds of the 
frigate are activated. The decoy (model 1) has a 0.35 probability of attracting an inbound 
RedFire.  
If a RedFire closes within 3 kyds of frigate, then it can also be engaged by an 
Area Terminal Type Defense (ATTD) system (model 1). A single ATTD system has a 
0.3 probability of killing an inbound RedFire. There are two ATTD onboard the frigate in 
the force. The total time for a full ATTD engagement is 2 seconds (acquire, track, fire).   
Scenario 2. Details of the second scenario setting (Escort Mission: swarm missile 
attack versus a force of four AWS and five frigates) are as shown here: 
A force of four AWS transporting high valued items protected by five frigates is 
attacked by a near-simultaneous launch of 200 surface skimming anti-ship cruise 
missiles. The defense capability of the AWS consists of only the ATTD.  
The incoming missiles (RedFire) can be detected by frigate surveillance radar 
model 1 at a maximum range of 42 kyds. The time to detect and classify a target for the 
expected sea state is lognormally distributed with a mean of 4 seconds and a standard 
deviation of 2 seconds. The five frigates share a common combat management system 
and can simultaneously track and classify up to 250 incoming missiles. 
The five frigates are armed with a BlueIntercept SAM missiles system (model 1). 
They are fired sequentially at a minimum interval of 3 seconds per missile per ship. The 
BlueIntercept missiles fly at a speed of 1.1 kyds per second. Each BlueIntercept missile 
has a 0.70 probability of kill against a RedFire missile. The BlueIntercept missile has a 
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maximum range of 72 kyds and a minimum range of 5 kyds (engagement inside 5 kyds is 
not possible due to safety stand-off). 
Each frigate is armed only with 32 BlueIntercept missiles. 
The RedFire missile flies at about Mach 1.25 (standard day, about 0.47 kyds per 
second) and is launched from a point at least 100 kyds from the AWS and frigates.   
Each RedFire has a probability of hitting one of the ships at the force of 0.80, and 
given a hit, a probability of sinking a frigate = 0.30, and sinking an AWS = 0.15. 
The RedFire uses a radar-seeker head and is more likely to hit a larger target (in 
proportion to the Radar Cross Section [RCS] of the ship). The AWS is considered to have 
two times the RSC of the frigate.    
If a RedFire closes within 16 kyds of a targeted ship, then it will also be engaged 
by the frigate’s main gun system (model 1). The main gun system has a 0.4 probability of 
killing an inbound RedFire. The main gun does not provide cross-platform defensive 
coverage. There is one main gun per frigate in the force. The total time for a full main 
gun engagement is 3 seconds (acquire, track, fire).   
If RedFire closes within 10 kyds of frigate, then the decoy rounds of the frigate 
are activated. The decoy (model 1) has a 0.35 probability of attracting an inbound 
RedFire. The decoy does not provide cross-platform defensive coverage.  
If a RedFire closes within 3 kyds of a targeted ship, then it can also be engaged by 
an ATTD system (model 1). A single ATTD system has a 0.3 probability of killing an 
inbound RedFire. ATTD do not provide cross-platform defensive coverage. There are 
two ATTD per ship in the force. The total time for a full ATTD engagement is 2 seconds 
(acquire, track, fire). 
The capabilities of the defense systems are shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6.   Fleet Defense Capabilities 
 
The defense detection and engagement range of the new multi-role stealth frigate 
includes SAM, main gun, decoy, and ATTD system, as shown in Figure 18.  
Figure 18.  Fleet Defense Detection and Engagement Range 
 
Summary Table from the Scenario 
RedFire Missile Specifications   Speed = 0.47 kyds/sec 
   Launched from a point at least 100 kyds from Amphibious Warfare ships(AWS)/Frigates 
P(Hitting Ships) = 0.8 
   P(Sinking a Frigate|Hitting ships) = 0.3 
  P(Sinking an AWS|Hitting ships) = 0.15 
  
      Radar Sensor Detection against Missiles Specifications   Max Detection Range against missile = 42 kyd  
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TTD is log normally distributed with mean = 4sec and sd = 2sec 
Maximum simultaneously tracking is 200 tracks 
 
      BlueIntercept Missile (SAM) Specifications   Fired sequentially at minimum interval of 3 sec per missile per ship 
Speed = 1.1 kyds/sec 
   P(Kill against Redfire) is 0.7 
   Maximum Range = 72 kyds 
   Minimum engagement range of 5 kyds 
        Main Gun Defense Specifications  
Engagement within 16kyds 
   P(Kill against leakers) = 0.4 
   Time to engage(Acquire, Track, Fire) is 3 sec 
 
      Decoy Specifications  Engagement within 10kyds 
   P(Kill against leakers) = 0.35 
   
      Area Terminal Type Defense (ATTD) Specifications 
 Engagement within 3kyds 
   P(Kill against leakers) = 0.3 
   Time to engage(Acquire, Track, Fire) is 2 sec   
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APPENDIX B.  FUNCTIONAL AND PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE 
Figure 19.  Top-Level Functions of Maritime Escort Operation 
 
Figure 20.  Second-Level Functions of Transit to Mission Area 
 
Figure 21.  Second-Level Functions of Navigate fleet 
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Figure 22.  Second-Level Functions of Execute C4I 
 
Figure 23.  Second-Level Functions of Conduct AAW 
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Table 7.   Top-Level Functions Mapped to Physical System 
Number Function Physical Component 
0 Conduct Maritime Escort Operation Frigate 
1 Transit to Mission Area Propulsion System 
1.1 Produce Propulsive Power Main Propulsion System 
1.2 Transfer Power to Water Ship Propellers 
1.3 Control Direction and Speed Engineering Operations Station 
2 Navigate Fleet Integrated Navigation System (INS) 
2.1 Maintain Course INS  
2.2 Maintain Fleet Formation CMS & INS 
3 Execute C4I C4I, CMS & ICS 
3.1 Monitor Environment ESM & Surveillance Radar 
3.2 Communication ICS 
3.2.1 Establish Contacts with fleet and HQ ICS 
3.2.2 Update Course GPS 
3.2.3 Update Speed Speed log 
3.2.4 Update Position GPS 
3.3 Command & Control Assets CMS 
3.4 Manage Intelligence C4I 
3.4.1 Receive Intelligence Antenna 
3.4.2 Produce Intelligence C4I 
3.4.3 Disseminate Intelligence HF Antenna/Satcom 
4 Conduct AAW CMS, Sensors, Weapons & Decoys 
4.1 Find Targets ESM, Surveillance Radar 
4.1.1 Search for Contacts ESM, Surveillance Radar 
4.1.2 Detect Contacts ESM, Surveillance Radar 
4.1.3 Classify Contacts Surveillance System with Identification 
Protocols 
4.2 Fix on Targets Surveillance Radar, FCR 
4.2.1 Determine Target Position ESM, Surveillance Radar 
4.2.2 Determine Target Course ESM, Surveillance Radar 
4.2.3 Determine Target Speed ESM, Surveillance Radar 
4.3 Track on Targets Surveillance Radar, FCR 
4.3.1 Update Target Position CMS & MLS 
4.3.2 Update Target Course CMS & MLS 
4.3.3 Update Target Speed CMS & MLS 
4.4 Employ Weapons/CM Weapons/Decoy 
4.4.1 Target the Threats FCR 
4.4.1.1 Determine Firing Solution CMS 
4.4.1.2 Update Firing Solution CMS 
4.4.2 Engage Weapons/CM SAM, Main Gun, ATTD, Decoy 
4.4.2.1 Fire Weapons SAM, Main Gun, ATTD 
4.4.2.2 Fire Decoy Decoy 
4.5 Assess Situation Surveillance Radar & FCR 
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Number Function Physical Component 
4.5.1 Conduct BDA CMS 
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APPENDIX C.  PAYLOAD CONFIGURATION VS. MISSION 
CAPABILITIES 
The baseline payload configuration is all the systems as shown in the payload 
configuration column of Table 8. This baseline configuration is used and built 
incrementally in the AOA. 
Table 8.   Payload Configuration vs. Mission Capabilities 
 
Payload Configuration
SS AAW ASuW ASW CM AC MM
Integrated Navigation System (INS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Integrated Communication System (ICS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HELIVAS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Combat Management System (CMS) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electronic Support Measures(ESM) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Volume Search Surveillance Radar 2 0 0 0 0 0 0










Main Gun - 76mm Gun - Second Layer Defense




20mm Secondary Gun - Third Layer Defense 




Surface to Surface Missile (SSM) 3 3 3 0 0 0 0
Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) - Torpedo System 3 3 3 1 0 0 0
Towed Array Sonar 3 3 3 2 0 0 0
Torpedo Countermeasure 3 3 3 3 0 0 0
C




Helicopter 3 3 3 3 1 1 0
Mission Module(UAV) 3 3 3 3 1 1 1
Mission Module(USV) 3 3 3 3 1 1 2












































APPENDIX D.  TOPSIDE DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
CHECKLIST 
Table 9.   Topside Design Considerations Checklist 
S/N  Design  Consideration Items to Check Checked  Remarks 
1 Weapon Integration i) Weapon Coverage (Arc of Firing) √  
  ii) Interaction with Other Projectiles √    
  iii) Gun Blast and Overpressure √  
  iv) Limit Stops √  




  vi) Operation & Maintenance Space of Weapon √  
  vii) Parking Position of weapon √  
  viii) Foundation Frequency √  
     
2 Blockage i) Transmissions/Reception Arcs √   
     
3 
Access & Maintenance 
 
i) Equipment Installation and Embarkation Route √   
 ii) Equipment Maintenance & Repair Space √   
 iii) Equipment Operation & Movement Space √  




  v) Antenna Limit/Buffer Stop √  
  vi) Ammunition Route   
      
4 Navigation i) Meet SOLAS Requirement √   
  ii) Seamanship Restriction √   
  iii) Visibility  √  
      
5 Stability i) Topside Weight √   
  ii) Windage & Turbulence √   
      
6 EMI/EMC Control Plan i) Cable Penetration and Concealing √ 
Zones 
indicated 
  ii) Ventilation Opening and Shielded Doors √  
      
7 Separation i) From Other Equipment, Power/Frequency √   
  ii) From Superstructures, Antennae Characteristics √  
     
8 RADHAZ i) Personnel (HERP) √  
  ii) Explosives Fuel (HERF) /Replenishment at Sea(RAS) √  
  iii) Aviation (HIRF) √  
  iv) Ordnance (HERO) √   
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S/N  Design  Consideration Items to Check Checked  Remarks 
     
9 Ballistic Protection i) Armor Plate Protection Coverage √   
     
10 Superstructure Material i) Steel, Aluminum, Composite (Fiber Reinforced) √ 
Material : 
composite 
  ii) Galvanic Corrosion Issue √  
     
11 RAS i) Routes √   
  ii) Positions √  
  iii) Special Handling √  
     
12 Missile Integration & 
Efflux 
i) Personnel Safety √   
 ii) Missile Installation and Embarkation Route √   
  iii) Efflux Temperature Profile (Missile Area) √  
  iv) Efflux Pressure Profile (Missile Area) √  
  v) Toxic Gases Component of Efflux √  
  vi) Blast Panel √  
  vii) Interaction with Other Projectiles √ e.g., SAM and decoys 
  viii) Firing Arc and Clearance Zone (Conical Shape) √  
  ix) Ejection of Debris  √  
  x) Missile Electromagnetic Susceptibility √  
  xi) Foundation Strength Requirements, Alignment, & Foundation Frequency √  
  xii) Ammo Safety and Fire Fighting Capability √  
      
13 Alignment of Topside 
Equipment with Ship’s 
Master Datum Plate 
i) Static and Dynamic √   
 ii) Flexure √  
      
14 Shock & Vibration i) Equipment Able to Qualify to Withstand the Shock & Vibration √  
     
15 Funnel Gases i) Temperature of Exhaust Gases √ 
250 degree 
Celsius at 1m 
away 
  ii) Direction of Exhaust Gases √   
      
16 Green Seas i) Equipment Able to Qualify to Withstand the Sea Spray & IP Rating √  
     
17 Radar Cross Section  √  
     
18 IR Signature  X  
     
19 Laser Safety i) Check the Laser Finder Is Eye Safe  √  
     
20 Magazine Location i) Check the Ventilation of Ammo Locker & Handling √  
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S/N  Design  Consideration Items to Check Checked  Remarks 
     
21 
Damage Control/NBC 
i) Check that Ventilation Openings, Doors, and 




    
     
22 Docking/Berthing 
Considerations 
 √  
    
     
23 Electromagnetic 
Interference 
i) Frequency Spectrum Utilization Chart √  
 ii) Source & Victim Matrix √  
  ii) Multipath Effects √ Shaping required 
     
24 Aviation Interactions i)  Helicopter Operation √  
  ii) Air Turbulence √  
  iii) Recovery of UAV √  
  Iv Flight Deck Requirement √  
     
25 Shielding/Ground  
Planes 
i) EMI/EMC Shielding and Isolation Purposes √  
    
     
26 Compartment  i) Requirement of Blast-Off Panel √  
 Overpressure    
     
27 Replenishment at Sea 
(RAS) 
i) RAS Operation and Requirement √  
 ii) Hazardous Zone Consideration √  
     
28 Boat Handling i) Boats Operation & Boat Handling Equipment √  
     
29 
Life Saving Equipment 
i) Meet SOLAS Requirement √  
 ii) Size of the Passageways √  
     
     
30 Escape Route & 
Walkway 
i) Class Requirement on Escape Route (w:900mm) √  
 ii) Handrails, Ladder, Guard Ropes for Safe Access √  
     
31 
Structural Integrity 
i) Natural Frequency of Mast and Foundation √  
 ii) Stiffness, Flatness, & Strength √  
     
32 Thermal Expansion of 
Foundation 
i) Thermal Analysis √  
    
     
33 Hazardous Zone i) Class Requirement √  
     
34 Mast Height i) Radar Required Performance √  
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S/N  Design  Consideration Items to Check Checked  Remarks 
 Restriction    
     
35 Scenario Modeling i) Range to Target Model √  
     
36 Lightning Protection  √  
     
     
37 Human Ergonomics  i) Based on Required Standards √  
     
38 Future Growth 
(FFBNW/FTR) 
i) Mission Modules Requirement √  
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APPENDIX E.  SHIP RESEARCH DATABASE 
The length, beam, draft, displacement, and speed information are referenced from 
IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships (Saunders 2014). The beam draft ratio and length 
displacement ratio are calculated. 


























2 Fremm France 142.0 20.0 5.0 4.00 7.114 6000 27 
 




Africa 121.0 16.3 6.0 2.75 7.581 3700 28 
 





Nansen Norway 134.0 16.8 4.6 3.65 7.081 5290 26 
 





Bazan Spain 146.7 18.6 4.8 3.92 7.260 6391 28.5 
 
 9 Type 054 China 134.1 16.0 5.0 3.20 7.224 4053 27 
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APPENDIX F.  TOPSIDE SIZING MODEL PARAMETERS AND 
DESIGNS 
Table 10.   Design Parameters of the Topside Sizing Model (Part 1) 
Design Parameters Length Proportion 
Front space of forecastle of ship 0.065 
Forward block (inclusive of fwd stacked mast) 0.14 
Aft block (inclusive of aft stacked mast and 
funnel) 
0.11 
Hangar 3m added to overall hangar length 
 
Figure 24 shows the ship design with 2 ATTD, and Figure 25 shows the ship 
design with 3 ATTD. 
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Figure 24.  Ship Design with Two ATTD 
 
Figure 25.  Ship Design with Three ATTD 
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7 0 0.65 0 0.8775
8 0 0.8 0 1.08
9
0 0.65 4 0.6955 4 0.78
10
11 3.60 2









21 Mission Module(LDUUV) on topside (modular concept) - kept in 1st deck
deployed from 1st deck
Mission Module(UAV) on topside (modular concept) - stored in hangar,
deployed on helideck
Mission Module(USV) on topside (modular concept) - kept in boat area
Torpedo Countermeasure on topside(on hangar roof)
Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) - on topside
Towed Array Sonar below deck
Heli Visual Aids System (HELIVAS) on topside(on hangar roof)
Ammunition inboard except RUL
Helicopter on topside
Surface to Air Missile (SAM) on topside
Heavy Machine Guns on topside(bridge wings)
Surface to Surface Missile (SSM) on topside
Area Terminal Type Defense (ATTD) 
system
one in front of SAM(C), second(C/port) 
and third(stbd) on topside(on hangar roof)
Decoy System on topside
Main Gun on topside
Combat Management System inboard
Electronic Support Measures(ESM) on stacked mast(aft block) 
Fire Control Systems on bridge top (fwd  block)
Surveillance System on stacked mast(fwd block) 
Integrated Navigation Systems (INS) on stacked mast and bridge top of 
superstructure and inboard
Integrated Communication System (ICS) on topside and inboard
Payload Configuration Location
 70 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
  
 71 
APPENDIX G. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT: MINITAB 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Table 12.   Minitab Inputs and Outputs for Scenario 1 
 
Detection Range Launch Interval BI Max Range BI Max Speed BI P(Kill) Main Gun Main Gun Decoy ATTD Range ATTD P(Kill) RCS Frigate sunk
42 1 72 1.1 0.7 16 0.4 0.5 3 0.4 0.9 0.38
80 1 100 1.1 0.95 16 0.4 0.5 6 0.3 0.9 0.098
80 1 100 1.1 0.95 24 0.4 0.5 3 0.4 0.6 0
80 3 72 1.5 0.7 24 0.6 0.35 6 0.3 0.6 0.008
80 1 72 1.1 0.95 16 0.6 0.35 6 0.3 0.9 0.196
42 1 100 1.1 0.7 16 0.6 0.35 3 0.4 0.9 0.796
80 1 72 1.5 0.7 24 0.6 0.5 3 0.4 0.6 0.008
42 1 72 1.5 0.95 24 0.4 0.35 6 0.3 0.6 0
80 1 72 1.1 0.7 24 0.4 0.35 3 0.3 0.9 0.81
80 1 72 1.1 0.7 16 0.4 0.35 6 0.4 0.6 0.028
80 1 100 1.1 0.7 24 0.6 0.5 3 0.3 0.9 0.54
80 3 72 1.5 0.7 16 0.6 0.35 3 0.4 0.9 0.842
80 3 100 1.5 0.95 16 0.6 0.5 3 0.3 0.6 0
42 1 100 1.1 0.95 24 0.4 0.35 6 0.4 0.9 0.106
42 3 72 1.1 0.95 16 0.6 0.35 6 0.4 0.6 0.004
80 3 100 1.5 0.95 24 0.6 0.5 6 0.4 0.9 0.004
42 3 72 1.5 0.7 24 0.6 0.5 3 0.3 0.9 0.772
80 1 100 1.5 0.7 16 0.4 0.35 6 0.3 0.9 0.356
42 1 100 1.5 0.95 16 0.6 0.5 3 0.4 0.9 0.242
42 3 100 1.1 0.95 24 0.4 0.5 3 0.3 0.9 0.744
80 3 100 1.1 0.95 16 0.4 0.35 3 0.4 0.9 0.574
80 3 72 1.5 0.95 16 0.4 0.35 3 0.3 0.6 0.006
80 3 72 1.5 0.95 24 0.4 0.35 6 0.4 0.9 0.102
80 1 100 1.5 0.95 24 0.6 0.35 3 0.3 0.9 0.462
42 1 100 1.1 0.95 16 0.4 0.35 3 0.3 0.6 0.002
42 3 100 1.5 0.95 24 0.6 0.35 3 0.4 0.6 0.01
42 1 72 1.1 0.95 16 0.6 0.5 3 0.3 0.6 0
42 3 100 1.5 0.95 16 0.6 0.35 6 0.3 0.9 0.676
42 3 72 1.1 0.7 24 0.4 0.35 3 0.4 0.6 0.326
42 3 72 1.1 0.95 24 0.6 0.35 3 0.3 0.9 0.708
42 3 100 1.5 0.7 24 0.4 0.35 3 0.3 0.9 0.952
42 3 100 1.5 0.7 16 0.4 0.35 6 0.4 0.6 0.18
80 3 100 1.1 0.95 24 0.4 0.35 6 0.3 0.6 0
42 1 72 1.5 0.7 24 0.6 0.35 6 0.4 0.9 0.378
42 1 72 1.5 0.95 16 0.4 0.35 3 0.4 0.9 0.572
80 3 100 1.1 0.7 24 0.6 0.35 6 0.4 0.9 0.35
42 3 100 1.1 0.95 16 0.4 0.5 6 0.4 0.6 0.004
80 1 100 1.1 0.7 16 0.6 0.5 6 0.4 0.6 0.002
80 1 72 1.5 0.7 16 0.6 0.5 6 0.3 0.9 0.466
42 3 100 1.1 0.7 24 0.6 0.5 3 0.4 0.6 0.082
42 1 72 1.5 0.7 16 0.6 0.35 3 0.3 0.6 0.094
80 3 100 1.5 0.7 16 0.4 0.5 3 0.4 0.9 0.754
42 1 100 1.5 0.95 24 0.6 0.5 6 0.3 0.6 0
80 1 72 1.1 0.95 24 0.6 0.35 3 0.4 0.6 0
80 3 100 1.5 0.7 24 0.4 0.5 6 0.3 0.6 0.01
80 3 72 1.1 0.7 24 0.4 0.5 6 0.4 0.9 0.342
80 3 72 1.1 0.7 16 0.4 0.5 3 0.3 0.6 0.112
42 1 100 1.1 0.7 24 0.6 0.35 6 0.3 0.6 0.018
80 1 72 1.5 0.95 16 0.4 0.5 6 0.4 0.6 0
80 1 72 1.5 0.95 24 0.4 0.5 3 0.3 0.9 0.292
42 3 72 1.5 0.7 16 0.6 0.5 6 0.4 0.6 0.052
80 3 72 1.1 0.95 24 0.6 0.5 6 0.3 0.6 0
42 3 72 1.5 0.95 24 0.4 0.5 3 0.4 0.6 0.032
42 1 72 1.1 0.7 24 0.4 0.5 6 0.3 0.6 0.018
42 3 100 1.1 0.7 16 0.6 0.5 6 0.3 0.9 0.74
42 3 72 1.1 0.7 16 0.4 0.35 6 0.3 0.9 0.952
42 3 72 1.5 0.95 16 0.4 0.5 6 0.3 0.9 0.588
80 1 100 1.5 0.95 16 0.6 0.35 6 0.4 0.6 0
42 1 100 1.5 0.7 24 0.4 0.5 6 0.4 0.9 0.324
80 1 100 1.5 0.7 24 0.4 0.35 3 0.4 0.6 0.076
80 3 100 1.1 0.7 16 0.6 0.35 3 0.3 0.6 0.104
80 3 72 1.1 0.95 16 0.6 0.5 3 0.4 0.9 0.322
42 1 72 1.1 0.95 24 0.6 0.5 6 0.4 0.9 0.004
42 1 100 1.5 0.7 16 0.4 0.5 3 0.3 0.6 0.132
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Interval BI Max Range BI Max Speed BI P(Kill) Main Gun Range Main Gun P(Kill) Decoy P(Kill) ATTD Range ATTD P(Kill) RCS AWS Frigate
80 3 72 1.5 0.95 16 0.4 0.35 3 0.3 2.5 2.24 0.012
80 1 72 1.1 0.95 16 0.6 0.35 6 0.3 5 1.16 0.006
80 3 72 1.1 0.7 16 0.4 0.5 3 0.3 2.5 3.37 0.048
42 1 72 1.5 0.7 24 0.6 0.35 6 0.4 5 2.32 0
42 3 72 1.5 0.7 24 0.6 0.5 3 0.3 5 3.36 0.05
80 3 100 1.1 0.95 24 0.4 0.35 6 0.3 2.5 1.64 0
42 1 100 1.5 0.95 16 0.6 0.5 3 0.4 5 1.56 0.004
42 3 72 1.1 0.7 16 0.4 0.35 6 0.3 5 3.08 0.298
80 3 100 1.1 0.7 16 0.6 0.35 3 0.3 2.5 3.3 0.018
80 3 100 1.5 0.7 24 0.4 0.5 6 0.3 2.5 3.01 0.004
42 3 100 1.1 0.7 24 0.6 0.5 3 0.4 2.5 3.57 0.004
42 3 72 1.5 0.7 16 0.6 0.5 6 0.4 2.5 3.42 0.004
42 3 100 1.5 0.7 16 0.4 0.35 6 0.4 2.5 3.41 0.014
80 3 100 1.1 0.95 16 0.4 0.35 3 0.4 5 2.1 0.008
80 1 100 1.1 0.95 24 0.4 0.5 3 0.4 2.5 2.09 0.006
80 1 72 1.1 0.7 16 0.4 0.35 6 0.4 2.5 2.87 0.008
42 1 100 1.1 0.7 24 0.6 0.35 6 0.3 2.5 3.06 0
42 1 100 1.5 0.7 24 0.4 0.5 6 0.4 5 2.23 0.008
80 1 72 1.5 0.95 24 0.4 0.5 3 0.3 5 1.76 0.016
80 1 72 1.5 0.7 24 0.6 0.5 3 0.4 2.5 2.96 0.012
42 3 72 1.1 0.95 24 0.6 0.35 3 0.3 5 2.89 0.016
42 1 72 1.1 0.95 24 0.6 0.5 6 0.4 5 0.72 0
42 1 100 1.5 0.7 16 0.4 0.5 3 0.3 2.5 3.34 0.056
80 3 100 1.5 0.95 24 0.6 0.5 6 0.4 5 0.74 0
42 3 72 1.5 0.95 16 0.4 0.5 6 0.3 5 2.43 0.04
42 3 72 1.1 0.7 24 0.4 0.35 3 0.4 2.5 3.6 0.05
80 1 100 1.5 0.95 24 0.6 0.35 3 0.3 5 1.77 0.002
42 1 72 1.5 0.95 16 0.4 0.35 3 0.4 5 1.65 0.036
42 1 100 1.1 0.95 24 0.4 0.35 6 0.4 5 0.67 0.002
42 3 100 1.1 0.95 16 0.4 0.5 6 0.4 2.5 2.73 0.002
42 3 72 1.1 0.95 16 0.6 0.35 6 0.4 2.5 2.77 0
80 1 100 1.1 0.95 16 0.4 0.5 6 0.3 5 1.16 0.004
80 3 72 1.5 0.7 16 0.6 0.35 3 0.4 5 2.81 0.088
42 1 72 1.1 0.7 24 0.4 0.5 6 0.3 2.5 3.06 0
42 1 72 1.5 0.7 16 0.6 0.35 3 0.3 2.5 3.3 0.024
80 1 100 1.5 0.7 16 0.4 0.35 6 0.3 5 2.56 0.116
80 3 72 1.5 0.7 24 0.6 0.35 6 0.3 2.5 3.05 0.002
80 1 72 1.1 0.95 24 0.6 0.35 3 0.4 2.5 2.08 0
42 3 100 1.1 0.95 24 0.4 0.5 3 0.3 5 2.9 0.074
42 1 72 1.1 0.95 16 0.6 0.5 3 0.3 2.5 2.23 0
80 3 100 1.1 0.7 24 0.6 0.35 6 0.4 5 2.29 0
80 3 72 1.1 0.95 24 0.6 0.5 6 0.3 2.5 1.63 0
80 3 72 1.1 0.95 16 0.6 0.5 3 0.4 5 1.67 0.004
42 1 100 1.1 0.7 16 0.6 0.35 3 0.4 5 2.94 0.114
80 1 100 1.1 0.7 16 0.6 0.5 6 0.4 2.5 2.87 0
42 3 100 1.5 0.7 24 0.4 0.35 3 0.3 5 3.35 0.514
80 1 100 1.5 0.7 24 0.4 0.35 3 0.4 2.5 3.2 0.02
42 3 100 1.1 0.7 16 0.6 0.5 6 0.3 5 3.16 0.044
42 3 100 1.5 0.95 16 0.6 0.35 6 0.3 5 2.41 0.038
80 1 72 1.1 0.7 24 0.4 0.35 3 0.3 5 3.01 0.198
80 3 72 1.5 0.95 24 0.4 0.35 6 0.4 5 0.75 0.002
42 1 72 1.1 0.7 16 0.4 0.5 3 0.4 5 2.85 0.158
42 1 100 1.1 0.95 16 0.4 0.35 3 0.3 2.5 1.63 0.028
80 3 100 1.5 0.7 16 0.4 0.5 3 0.4 5 1.65 0.044
80 3 100 1.5 0.95 16 0.6 0.5 3 0.3 2.5 2.25 0
80 3 72 1.1 0.7 24 0.4 0.5 6 0.4 5 2.3 0.006
80 1 100 1.1 0.7 24 0.6 0.5 3 0.3 5 2.97 0.014
42 1 72 1.5 0.95 24 0.4 0.35 6 0.3 2.5 1.67 0
42 3 100 1.5 0.95 24 0.6 0.35 3 0.4 2.5 3.14 0.004
42 3 72 1.5 0.95 24 0.4 0.5 3 0.4 2.5 3.15 0.004
80 1 100 1.5 0.95 16 0.6 0.35 6 0.4 2.5 1.21 0
80 1 72 1.5 0.95 16 0.4 0.5 6 0.4 2.5 1.21 0
42 1 100 1.5 0.95 24 0.6 0.5 6 0.3 2.5 1.61 0
80 1 72 1.5 0.7 16 0.6 0.5 6 0.3 5 2.54 0.014
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APPENDIX H. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS PARAMETERS AND 
RESULTS 


































Integrated Navigation System (INS) 1.2 - - - - - - - - -
Integrated Communication System (ICS) 1.5 - - - - - - - - -
HELIVAS 1 - - - - - - - - -
Combat Management System (CMS) - Model 1 10 3 - - - - - - - -
Combat Management System (CMS) - Model 2 20 1 - - - - - - - -
Electronic Support Measures(ESM) 3 - - - - - - - - -
Volume Search Surveillance Radar Model 1 10 - 42 - - - - - - -
Volume Search Surveillance Radar Model 2 20 - 80 - - - - - - -
Fire Control Radar 8 - - - - - - - - -
Surface to Air Missile (SAM) Model 1 - First Layer Defense 18 - - 72 1.1 0.7 - - - -
Surface to Air Missile (SAM) Model 2 - First Layer Defense 30 - - 100 1.5 0.95 - - - -
Main Gun - 127mm Gun - Second Layer Defense 19 - - - - - 24 0.6 - -
Main Gun - 76mm Gun - Second Layer Defense 11 - - - - - 16 0.4 - -
Close in Weapon System (CIWS) - 
Third Layer Defense Model 3 15




30mm Secondary Gun - Third Layer Defense Model 2 5 - - - - - - - - 0.4 6





Surface to Surface Missile (SSM) 15 - - - - - - - - -
Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) - Torpedo System 8 - - - - - - - - -
Towed Array Sonar 5 - - - - - - - - -
Torpedo Countermeasure 3 - - - - - - - - -
Decoy System Model 1 6 - - - - - - - 0.35 -




Helicopter 50 - - - - - - - - -
Mission Module(UAV) 4 - - - - - - - - -
Mission Module(USV) 2.5 - - - - - - - - -
Mission Module(LDUUV) 2 - - - - - - - - -
Assumptions
1 Cost of RCS improvement $ 15 M per frigate
2 Cost per meter length of frigate is $ 3.25 M
3 RCS has no change to length and beam and displacement













































Table 15.   Sensitivity Analysis Results 
 
BI P(Kill) 0.95 RCS 2.5 Main Gun P(Kill) 0.6
AWS Frigate AWS Frigate AWS Frigate
Mean 2.902 0.404 Mean 3.664 0.28 Mean 3.406 0.47
Standard Error 0.039139 0.02747869 Standard Error 0.024319 0.02272075 Standard Error 0.03281 0.027924174
Median 3 0 Median 4 0 Median 4 0
Mode 3 0 Mode 4 0 Mode 4 0
Standard Deviation 0.875173 0.61444209 Standard Deviation 0.543779 0.508051407 Standard Deviation 0.733649 0.624403523
Sample Variance 0.765928 0.37753908 Sample Variance 0.295695 0.258116232 Sample Variance 0.53824 0.38987976
Kurtosis 0.163053 1.23604761 Kurtosis 1.529852 2.589747411 Kurtosis 0.646361 0.56975674
Skewness -0.61883 1.35914004 Skewness -1.43029 1.700522216 Skewness -1.07815 1.080841891
Range 4 3 Range 3 3 Range 3 3
Minimum 0 0 Minimum 1 0 Minimum 1 0
Maximum 4 3 Maximum 4 3 Maximum 4 3
Sum 1451 202 Sum 1832 140 Sum 1703 235
Count 500 500 Count 500 500 Count 500 500
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 




less than 1% 
chance of losing 




less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS 0.054068 0.04601661
Confidence(90%) 








of more than 99% 
chance of 
survivability 0.945932 0.95398339
Results Fail Fail Results Fail Fail Results Fail Fail
ATTD P(Kill) 0.4 ATTD Range 6 kyds Decoy P(Kill) 0.5
AWS Frigate AWS Frigate AWS Frigate
Mean 3.346 0.84 Mean 3.14 0.284 Mean 3.372 0.686
Standard Error 0.031473 0.03643425 Standard Error 0.036489 0.02134477 Standard Error 0.032945 0.034075361
Median 3 1 Median 3 0 Median 4 1
Mode 4 1 Mode 3 0 Mode 4 0
Standard Deviation 0.703757 0.8146947 Standard Deviation 0.815924 0.477283563 Standard Deviation 0.736683 0.761948246
Sample Variance 0.495275 0.66372745 Sample Variance 0.665731 0.227799599 Sample Variance 0.542701 0.58056513
Kurtosis 0.025591 0.06483501 Kurtosis 0.345908 0.443292356 Kurtosis 1.367723 0.129842123
Skewness -0.77494 0.72567724 Skewness -0.79601 1.289831244 Skewness -1.10699 0.870477697
Range 3 4 Range 4 2 Range 4 3
Minimum 1 0 Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0
Maximum 4 4 Maximum 4 2 Maximum 4 3
Sum 1673 420 Sum 1570 142 Sum 1686 343
Count 500 500 Count 500 500 Count 500 500
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 




less than 1% 
chance of losing 




less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS 0.054291 0.056153231
Confidence(90%) 








of more than 99% 
chance of 
survivability 0.945709 0.943846769
Results Fail Fail Results Fail Fail Results Fail Fail
Input Changes from Baseline Input Changes from Baseline Input Changes from Baseline
Statistics Statistics Statistics
Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes
Upgrade ATTD Upgrade ATTD Upgrade Decoy
Input Changes from Baseline
Statistics Statistics Statistics
Option 4(4) Option 5 (5) Option 6 (6)
Input Changes from Baseline Input Changes from Baseline
Upgrade missile type Upgrade Main GunRCS improvement to 
ship & payload design
Option 1 (1) Option 2 (2) Option 3 (3)
Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes
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Detection Range 80 kyds Launch Interval 1 sec BI P(Kill) 0.95
RCS 2.5
AWS Frigate AWS Frigate AWS Frigate
Mean 2.978 0.494 Mean 2.98 0.46 Mean 3.21 0.066
Standard Error 0.037388 0.03042663 Standard Error 0.039526 0.030110019 Standard Error 0.035075 0.011114633
Median 3 0 Median 3 0 Median 3 0
Mode 3 0 Mode 3 0 Mode 4 0
Standard Deviation 0.836011 0.68036004 Standard Deviation 0.883834 0.673280486 Standard Deviation 0.784302 0.248530753
Sample Variance 0.698914 0.46288978 Sample Variance 0.781162 0.453306613 Sample Variance 0.61513 0.061767535
Kurtosis -0.37799 1.19388628 Kurtosis -0.03021 1.294335613 Kurtosis -0.637 10.33723836
Skewness -0.47513 1.2676006 Skewness -0.66039 1.352628682 Skewness -0.56306 3.506551741
Range 3 3 Range 4 3 Range 3 1
Minimum 1 0 Minimum 0 0 Minimum 1 0
Maximum 4 3 Maximum 4 3 Maximum 4 1
Sum 1489 247 Sum 1490 230 Sum 1605 33
Count 500 500 Count 500 500 Count 500 500
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 




less than 1% 
chance of losing 




less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS and a 
Frigate 0.057801 0.018315948
Confidence(90%) 








of more than 99% 
chance of 
survivability 0.942199 0.981684052
Results Fail Fail Results Fail Fail Results Fail Fail
BI P(Kill) 0.95 BI P(Kill) 0.95 BI P(Kill) 0.95
Main Gun P(Kill) 0.6 ATTD P(Kill) 0.4 RCS 2.5
Main Gun P(Kill) 0.6
AWS Frigate AWS Frigate AWS Frigate
Mean 2.9 0.158 Mean 2.776 0.282 Mean 3.254 0.02
Standard Error 0.039486 0.01818608 Standard Error 0.040976 0.022404373 Standard Error 0.033184 0.006267261
Median 3 0 Median 3 0 Median 3 0
Mode 3 0 Mode 3 0 Mode 3 0
Standard Deviation 0.882926 0.40665309 Standard Deviation 0.916244 0.500977001 Standard Deviation 0.742014 0.14014021
Sample Variance 0.779559 0.16536673 Sample Variance 0.839503 0.250977956 Sample Variance 0.550585 0.019639279
Kurtosis -0.28172 6.1811685 Kurtosis -0.22336 1.424735057 Kurtosis -0.22652 45.48597214
Skewness -0.4876 2.57059353 Skewness -0.4365 1.53360804 Skewness -0.65279 6.877793456
Range 4 2 Range 4 2 Range 3 1
Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0 Minimum 1 0
Maximum 4 2 Maximum 4 2 Maximum 4 1
Sum 1450 79 Sum 1388 141 Sum 1627 10
Count 500 500 Count 500 500 Count 500 500
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS 0.065069 0.02996908
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 




less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS and a 
Frigate 0.054684 0.0103279
Confidence(90%) 








of more than 99% 
chance of 
survivability 0.945316 0.9896721
Results Fail Fail Results Fail Fail Results Fail Fail
Statistics Statistics Statistics
Upgrade Main Gun
Input Changes from Baseline Input Changes from Baseline Input Changes from Baseline
Upgrade missile type Upgrade missile type Upgrade missile type
Upgrade Main Gun Upgrade ATTD RCS improvement to ship & payload design
Option 10 (1,3) Option 11 (1,4) Option 12 (1,2,3)
Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes





RCS improvement to ship & payload design
Statistics
Input Changes from Baseline
Option 7 (7) Option 8 (8)
Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes
Upgrade Sensor Upgrade CMS
 76 
 
BI P(Kill) 0.95 BI P(Kill) 0.95 BI P(Kill) 0.95
RCS 2.5 RCS 2.5 RCS 2.5
ATTD P(Kill) 0.4 Detection Range 80 kyds Main Gun P(Kill) 0.6
ATTD P(Kill) 0.4
AWS Frigate AWS Frigate AWS Frigate
Mean 3.21 0.064 Mean 2.206 0.006 Mean 3.208 0.004
Standard Error 0.034383 0.01095665 Standard Error 0.041697 0.003457153 Standard Error 0.035042 0.002825592
Median 3 0 Median 2 0 Median 3 0
Mode 3 0 Mode 2 0 Mode 3 0
Standard Deviation 0.768819 0.24499806 Standard Deviation 0.932364 0.077304281 Standard Deviation 0.783559 0.063182149
Sample Variance 0.591082 0.06002405 Sample Variance 0.869303 0.005975952 Sample Variance 0.613964 0.003991984
Kurtosis 0.344787 10.8131816 Kurtosis -0.24719 163.3132451 Kurtosis -0.27011 247.4839115
Skewness -0.72369 3.57350592 Skewness -0.12275 12.83199139 Skewness -0.65945 15.76369195
Range 4 1 Range 4 1 Range 3 1
Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0 Minimum 1 0
Maximum 4 1 Maximum 4 1 Maximum 4 1
Sum 1605 32 Sum 1103 3 Sum 1604 2
Count 500 500 Count 500 500 Count 500 500
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS 0.05666 0.0180556
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 




less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS and a 
Frigate 0.057746 0.004656329
Confidence(90%) 








of more than 99% 
chance of 
survivability 0.942254 0.995343671
Results Fail Fail Results Fail Pass Results Fail Pass
BI P(Kill) 0.95 BI P(Kill) 0.95 BI P(Kill) 0.95
RCS 2.5 RCS 2.5 RCS 2.5
Main Gun P(Kill) 0.6 Main Gun P(Kill) 0.6 Main Gun P(Kill) 0.6
ATTD Range 6 kyds ATTD P(Kill) 0.4 ATTD P(Kill) 0.4
ATTD Range 6 kyds ATTD Range 6 kyds
Detection Range 80 kyds
AWS Frigate AWS Frigate AWS Frigate
Mean 2.95 0.002 Mean 2.762 0.002 Mean 1.25 0
Standard Error 0.037226 0.002 Standard Error 0.041643 0.002 Standard Error 0.041887 0
Median 3 0 Median 3 0 Median 1 0
Mode 3 0 Mode 3 0 Mode 1 0
Standard Deviation 0.832398 0.04472136 Standard Deviation 0.931177 0.04472136 Standard Deviation 0.936619 0
Sample Variance 0.692886 0.002 Sample Variance 0.86709 0.002 Sample Variance 0.877255 0
Kurtosis 0.020281 500 Kurtosis -0.57714 500 Kurtosis -0.6988 0
Skewness -0.53401 22.3606798 Skewness -0.30234 22.36067977 Skewness 0.320486 0
Range 4 1 Range 4 1 Range 4 0
Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0
Maximum 4 1 Maximum 4 1 Maximum 4 0
Sum 1475 1 Sum 1381 1 Sum 625 0
Count 500 500 Count 500 500 Count 500 500
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS 0.061345 0.00329583
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 




less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS and a 
Frigate 0.069026 <0.001
Confidence(90%) 








of more than 99% 
chance of 
survivability 0.930974 >0.99
Results Fail Pass Results Fail Pass Results Fail Pass
Upgrade Sensor
Input Changes from Baseline Input Changes from Baseline
Statistics Statistics
Input Changes from Baseline
Statistics
RCS improvement to ship & payload design RCS improvement to ship & payload design
Upgrade Main Gun Upgrade Main Gun
Upgrade ATTD Upgrade ATTD
Option 17 (1,2,3,4,5) Option 18 (1,2,3,4,5,7)
Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes








Input Changes from Baseline Input Changes from Baseline
Statistics Statistics Statistics
Input Changes from Baseline
RCS improvement to ship & payload design RCS improvement to ship & payload design RCS improvement to ship & payload design
Upgrade ATTD Upgrade Sensor Upgrade Main Gun
Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes
Upgrade missile type Upgrade missile type Upgrade missile type
Option 13 (1,2,4) Option 14 (1,2,7) Option 15 (1,2,3,4)
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BI P(Kill) 0.95 BI P(Kill) 0.95 RCS 2.5
RCS 2.5 RCS 2.5 ATTD P(Kill) 0.95
Main Gun P(Kill) 0.6 ATTD P(Kill) 0.95 ATTD Range 12 kyds
ATTD P(Kill) 0.4 ATTD Range 12 kyds
ATTD Range 6 kyds
Detection Range 80 kyds
Decoy P(Kill) 0.5
AWS Frigate AWS Frigate AWS Frigate
Mean 1.206 0 Mean 0.004 0 Mean 0.192 0
Standard Error 0.038394 0 Standard Error 0.002826 0 Standard Error 0.017858 0
Median 1 0 Median 0 0 Median 0 0
Mode 1 0 Mode 0 0 Mode 0 0
Standard Deviation 0.858509 0 Standard Deviation 0.063182 0 Standard Deviation 0.399318 0
Sample Variance 0.737038 0 Sample Variance 0.003992 0 Sample Variance 0.159455 0
Kurtosis -0.14755 0 Kurtosis 247.4839 0 Kurtosis 1.074265 0
Skewness 0.392201 0 Skewness 15.76369 0 Skewness 1.66309 0
Range 4 0 Range 1 0 Range 2 0
Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0
Maximum 4 0 Maximum 1 0 Maximum 2 0
Sum 603 0 Sum 2 0 Sum 96 0
Count 500 500 Count 500 500 Count 500 500
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS 0.063269 <0.001
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 




less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS and a 
Frigate 0.029429 <0.001
Confidence(90%) 








of more than 99% 
chance of 
survivability 0.970571 >0.99
Results Fail Pass Results Pass Pass Results Fail Pass
RCS 2.5 RCS 2.5 RCS 2.5
Main Gun P(Kill) 0.6 Main Gun P(Kill) 0.6 Main Gun P(Kill) 0.6
ATTD P(Kill) 0.95 ATTD P(Kill) 0.95 ATTD P(Kill) 0.8
ATTD Range 12 kyds ATTD Range 10 kyds ATTD Range 12 kyds
AWS Frigate AWS Frigate AWS Frigate
Mean 0.26 0 Mean 0.012 0 Mean 0.018 0
Standard Error 0.021016 0 Standard Error 0.004874 0 Standard Error 0.005952 0
Median 0 0 Median 0 0 Median 0 0
Mode 0 0 Mode 0 0 Mode 0 0
Standard Deviation 0.469938 0 Standard Deviation 0.108994 0 Standard Deviation 0.133084 0
Sample Variance 0.220842 0 Sample Variance 0.01188 0 Sample Variance 0.017711 0
Kurtosis 1.168533 0 Kurtosis 79.14671 0 Kurtosis 51.09539 0
Skewness 1.497789 0 Skewness 8.990558 0 Skewness 7.272621 0
Range 2 0 Range 1 0 Range 1 0
Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0
Maximum 2 0 Maximum 1 0 Maximum 1 0
Sum 130 0 Sum 6 0 Sum 9 0
Count 500 500 Count 500 500 Count 500 500
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS 0.034633 <0.001
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS 0.008033 <0.001
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS 0.009808 <0.001
Confidence(90%) 








of more than 99% 
chance of 
survivability 0.990192 >0.99
Results Fail Pass Results Pass Pass Results Pass Pass
Statistics Statistics Statistics
Input Changes from Baseline Input Changes from Baseline Input Changes from Baseline
Install 3rd ATTD onboard each ship Install 3rd ATTD onboard each ship
Upgrade Main Gun Upgrade Main Gun Upgrade Main Gun
Upgrade ATTD Upgrade ATTD Upgrade ATTD
Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes
RCS improvement to ship & payload design RCS improvement to ship & payload design RCS improvement to ship & payload design
Input Changes from Baseline
Statistics
Option 22 (2, 3, 4, 5) Option 23 (2,3,4,5,9) Option 24 (2,3,4,5,9)
Option 21 (2, 4, 5)
Payload/Component Changes




Input Changes from Baseline Input Changes from Baseline
Statistics Statistics
RCS improvement to ship & payload design RCS improvement to ship & payload design
Upgrade Main Gun Upgrade ATTD
Upgrade ATTD
Option 19 (1,2,3,4,5,6,7) Option 20 (1,2,4,5)
Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes
Upgrade missile type Upgrade missile type
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RCS 2.5 RCS 2.5 Main Gun P(Kill) 0.6
ATTD P(Kill) 0.95 ATTD P(Kill) 0.8 ATTD P(Kill) 0.8
ATTD Range 10 kyds ATTD Range 12 kyds ATTD Range 12 kyds
AWS Frigate AWS Frigate AWS Frigate
Mean 0.008 0 Mean 0.164 0.018 Mean 0.792 0
Standard Error 0.003988 0 Standard Error 0.017053 0.005951709 Standard Error 0.033402 0
Median 0 0 Median 0 0 Median 1 0
Mode 0 0 Mode 0 0 Mode 1 0
Standard Deviation 0.089173 0 Standard Deviation 0.381307 0.13308427 Standard Deviation 0.746895 0
Sample Variance 0.007952 0 Sample Variance 0.145395 0.017711423 Sample Variance 0.557852 0
Kurtosis 121.2289 0 Kurtosis 2.846944 51.09538678 Kurtosis -0.36233 0
Skewness 11.07899 0 Skewness 2.035971 7.272621235 Skewness 0.561141 0
Range 1 0 Range 2 1 Range 3 0
Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0
Maximum 1 0 Maximum 2 1 Maximum 3 0
Sum 4 0 Sum 82 9 Sum 396 0
Count 500 500 Count 500 500 Count 500 500
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS 0.006572 <0.001
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS 0.028101 0.009807899
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS and a 
Frigate 0.055044 <0.001
Confidence(90%) 








of more than 99% 
chance of 
survivability 0.944956 >0.99
Results Pass Pass Results Fail Pass Results Fail Pass
Main Gun P(Kill) 0.6 Main Gun P(Kill) 0.6 Main Gun P(Kill) 0.6
ATTD P(Kill) 0.8 ATTD P(Kill) 0.8 ATTD P(Kill) 0.95
ATTD Range 12 kyds ATTD Range 12 kyds ATTD Range 10 kyds
Decoy P(Kill) 0.5 Detection Range 80 kyds
AWS Frigate AWS Frigate AWS Frigate
Mean 0.784 0 Mean 0.012 0 Mean 0.014 0
Standard Error 0.033897 0 Standard Error 0.004874 0 Standard Error 0.00526 0
Median 1 0 Median 0 0 Median 0 0
Mode 1 0 Mode 0 0 Mode 0 0
Standard Deviation 0.757953 0 Standard Deviation 0.108994 0 Standard Deviation 0.117608 0
Sample Variance 0.574493 0 Sample Variance 0.01188 0 Sample Variance 0.013832 0
Kurtosis -0.43402 0 Kurtosis 79.14671 0 Kurtosis 67.12411 0
Skewness 0.576681 0 Skewness 8.990558 0 Skewness 8.297929 0
Range 3 0 Range 1 0 Range 1 0
Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0
Maximum 3 0 Maximum 1 0 Maximum 1 0
Sum 392 0 Sum 6 0 Sum 7 0
Count 500 500 Count 500 500 Count 500 500
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 




less than 1% 
chance of losing 




less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS and a 
Frigate 0.008667 <0.001
Confidence(90%) 








of more than 99% 
chance of 
survivability 0.991333 >0.99
Results Fail Pass Results Pass Pass Results Pass Pass
Input Changes from Baseline Input Changes from Baseline Input Changes from Baseline
Statistics Statistics Statistics
Upgrade ATTD Upgrade ATTD Upgrade ATTD
Upgrade Decoy Upgrade Sensor Install 3rd ATTD onboard each ship
Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes
Upgrade Main Gun Upgrade Main Gun Upgrade Main Gun
Input Changes from Baseline
Statistics
Option 28 (3, 4, 5, 6) Option 29 (3, 4, 5, 7) Option 30 (3, 4, 5, 9)
Input Changes from Baseline Input Changes from Baseline
Statistics Statistics




RCS improvement to ship & payload design RCS improvement to ship & payload design
Upgrade ATTD Upgrade ATTD
Install 3rd ATTD onboard each ship Install 3rd ATTD onboard each ship
Option 25 (2,4,5,9) Option 26 (2,4,5,9)
Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes
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Main Gun P(Kill) 0.6 ATTD P(Kill) 0.95 ATTD P(Kill) 0.95
ATTD P(Kill) 0.8 ATTD Range 10 kyds ATTD Range 10 kyds
ATTD Range 12 kyds Decoy P(Kill) 0.5 Detection Range 80 kyds
AWS Frigate AWS Frigate AWS Frigate
Mean 0.014 0.016 Mean 0.158 0 Mean 0.014 0
Standard Error 0.00526 0.00561704 Standard Error 0.017282 0 Standard Error 0.00526 0
Median 0 0 Median 0 0 Median 0 0
Mode 0 0 Mode 0 0 Mode 0 0
Standard Deviation 0.117608 0.12560076 Standard Deviation 0.386438 0 Standard Deviation 0.117608 0
Sample Variance 0.013832 0.01577555 Sample Variance 0.149335 0 Sample Variance 0.013832 0
Kurtosis 67.12411 58.1076884 Kurtosis 4.439773 0 Kurtosis 67.12411 0
Skewness 8.297929 7.73791133 Skewness 2.290901 0 Skewness 8.297929 0
Range 1 1 Range 2 0 Range 1 0
Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0
Maximum 1 1 Maximum 2 0 Maximum 1 0
Sum 7 8 Sum 79 0 Sum 7 0
Count 500 500 Count 500 500 Count 500 500
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 




less than 1% 
chance of losing 




less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS and a 
Frigate 0.008667 <0.001
Confidence(90%) 








of more than 99% 
chance of 
survivability 0.991333 >0.99
Results Pass Pass Results Fail Pass Results Pass Pass
ATTD P(Kill) 0.8 ATTD P(Kill) 0.8 ATTD P(Kill) 0.95
ATTD Range 12 kyds ATTD Range 12 kyds ATTD Range 10 kyds
Detection Range 80 kyds
AWS Frigate AWS Frigate AWS Frigate
Mean 0.01 0 Mean 0.002 0 Mean 0 0
Standard Error 0.004454 0 Standard Error 0.002 0 Standard Error 0 0
Median 0 0 Median 0 0 Median 0 0
Mode 0 0 Mode 0 0 Mode 0 0
Standard Deviation 0.099598 0 Standard Deviation 0.044721 0 Standard Deviation 0 0
Sample Variance 0.00992 0 Sample Variance 0.002 0 Sample Variance 0 0
Kurtosis 95.97919 0 Kurtosis 500 0 Kurtosis 0 0
Skewness 9.879032 0 Skewness 22.36068 0 Skewness 0 0
Range 1 0 Range 1 0 Range 0 0
Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0
Maximum 1 0 Maximum 1 0 Maximum 0 0
Sum 5 0 Sum 1 0 Sum 0 0
Count 500 500 Count 500 500 Count 500 500
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 




less than 1% 
chance of losing 




less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS and a 
Frigate <0.001 <0.001
Confidence(90%) 








of more than 99% 
chance of 
survivability >0.99 >0.99
Results Pass Pass Results Pass Pass Results Pass Pass
Statistics Statistics Statistics
Input Changes from Baseline Input Changes from Baseline Input Changes from Baseline
Upgrade ATTD Upgrade ATTD Upgrade ATTD
Upgrade Sensor Install 3rd ATTD onboard each ship Install 3rd ATTD onboard each ship
Option 34 (4, 5,7) Option 35 (4, 5,9) Option 36 (4, 5,9)
Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes
Input Changes from Baseline Input Changes from Baseline
Statistics Statistics
Option 32 (4, 5,6) Option 33 (4, 5,7)
Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes
Upgrade ATTD Upgrade ATTD
Upgrade SensorUpgrade Decoy
Input Changes from Baseline
Statistics




Install 3rd ATTD onboard each ship
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Launch Interval 1 sec Launch Interval 1 sec Launch Interval 1 sec
BI P(Kill) 0.95 BI P(Kill) 0.95 BI P(Kill) 0.95
RCS 2.5 RCS 2.5
Main Gun P(Kill) 0.6
AWS Frigate AWS Frigate AWS Frigate
Mean 1.784 0.056 Mean 2.166 0.014 Mean 2.214 0
Standard Error 0.042595 0.01029271 Standard Error 0.045619 0.005259594 Standard Error 0.041326 0
Median 2 0 Median 2 0 Median 2 0
Mode 2 0 Mode 2 0 Mode 2 0
Standard Deviation 0.952449 0.23015199 Standard Deviation 1.020061 0.117608092 Standard Deviation 0.924073 0
Sample Variance 0.907158 0.05296994 Sample Variance 1.040525 0.013831663 Sample Variance 0.853912 0
Kurtosis -0.51451 13.0586624 Kurtosis -0.37067 67.12411057 Kurtosis -0.30629 0
Skewness 0.1499 3.8738151 Skewness -0.08693 8.29792914 Skewness -0.13121 0
Range 4 1 Range 4 1 Range 4 0
Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0
Maximum 4 1 Maximum 4 1 Maximum 4 0
Sum 892 28 Sum 1083 7 Sum 1107 0
Count 500 500 Count 500 500 Count 500 500
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 




less than 1% 
chance of losing 




less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS and a 
Frigate 0.068101 <0.001
Confidence(90%) 








of more than 99% 
chance of 
survivability 0.931899 >0.99
Results Fail Fail Results Fail Pass Results Fail Pass
Launch Interval 1 sec Launch Interval 1 sec
BI P(Kill) 0.95 BI P(Kill) 0.95
RCS 2.5 RCS 2.5
Main Gun P(Kill) 0.6 Main Gun P(Kill) 0.6
ATTD P(Kill) 0.6 ATTD P(Kill) 0.95
ATTD Range 6 kyds ATTD Range 12 kyds
AWS Frigate AWS Frigate
Mean 1.176 0 Mean 0 0
Standard Error 0.040365 0 Standard Error 0 0
Median 1 0 Median 0 0
Mode 1 0 Mode 0 0
Standard Deviation 0.902581 0 Standard Deviation 0 0
Sample Variance 0.814653 0 Sample Variance 0 0
Kurtosis -0.41882 0 Kurtosis 0 0
Skewness 0.417674 0 Skewness 0 0
Range 4 0 Range 0 0
Minimum 0 0 Minimum 0 0
Maximum 4 0 Maximum 0 0
Sum 588 0 Sum 0 0
Count 500 500 Count 500 500
Confidence 
Level(90.0%) of 
less than 1% 
chance of losing 




less than 1% 
chance of losing 
an AWS and a 
Frigate <0.001 <0.001
Confidence(90%) 




of more than 99% 
chance of 
survivability >0.99 >0.99
Results Fail Pass Results Pass Pass
Upgrade ATTD Upgrade ATTD
Input Changes from Baseline Input Changes from Baseline
Statistics Statistics
Upgrade missile type Upgrade missile type
RCS improvement to ship & payload design RCS improvement to ship & payload design
Upgrade Main Gun Upgrade Main Gun
Option 40 (1,2,3,4,5,8) Option 41 (1,2,3,4,5,8)
Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes
Upgrade CMS Upgrade CMS
Input Changes from Baseline Input Changes from Baseline Input Changes from Baseline
Statistics Statistics Statistics
Upgrade Main Gun
Upgrade missile type Upgrade missile type Upgrade missile type
RCS improvement to ship & payload design RCS improvement to ship & payload design
Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes Payload/Component Changes
Upgrade CMS Upgrade CMS Upgrade CMS
Option 37 (1, 8) Option 38 (1,2,8) Option 39 (1,2,3,8)
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APPENDIX I.  COST-EFFECTIVENESS RESULTS 














($M) ($M) ($M) Pass/Fail Design Buffer(m) Length(m) Beam(m) Draught(m)
Displacement
(tonnes) ($M) Cost($M)
Option 1 161.2 10 171.2 Pass 4.99 127.5 15.7 4.23 3807 414.375 585.575
Option 2 161.2 15 176.2 Pass 6.92 126.7 15.6 4.21 3740 411.775 587.975
Option 3 161.2 8 169.2 Pass 3.94 127 15.6 4.22 3770 412.75 581.95
Option 4 161.2 6 167.2 Pass 6.53 126.8 15.6 4.21 3744 412.1 579.3
Option 5 161.2 6 167.2 Pass 6.53 126.8 15.6 4.21 3744 412.1 579.3
Option 6 161.2 8 169.2 Pass 6.05 126.7 15.6 4.21 3742 411.775 580.975
Option 7 161.2 10 171.2 Pass 6.96 127.1 15.6 4.22 3772 413.075 584.275
Option 8 161.2 10 171.2 Pass 6.92 126.7 15.6 4.21 3740 411.775 582.975
Option 9 161.2 25 186.2 Pass 4.99 127.5 15.7 4.23 3807 414.375 600.575
Option 10 161.2 18 179.2 Pass 2.00 127.8 15.7 4.24 3838 415.35 594.55
Option 11 161.2 16 177.2 Pass 7.01 127.5 15.7 4.23 3812 414.375 591.575
Option 12 161.2 33 194.2 Pass 2.00 127.8 15.7 4.24 3838 415.35 609.55
Option 13 161.2 31 192.2 Pass 4.54 127.5 15.7 4.23 3812 414.375 606.575
Option 14 161.2 35 196.2 Pass 7.66 127.8 15.7 4.25 3840 415.35 611.55
Option 15 161.2 39 200.2 Pass 4.02 127.8 15.7 4.25 3842 415.35 615.55
Option 16 161.2 39 200.2 Pass 4.02 127.8 15.7 4.25 3842 415.35 615.55
Option 17 161.2 39 200.2 Pass 4.02 127.8 15.7 4.25 3842 415.35 615.55
Option 18 161.2 49 210.2 Pass 4.30 128.2 15.8 4.26 3874 416.65 626.85
Option 19 161.2 57 218.2 Pass 3.44 128.2 15.8 4.26 3876 416.65 634.85
Option 20 161.2 75 236.2 Pass 4.58 127.7 15.7 4.24 3828 415.025 651.225
Option 21 161.2 65 226.2 Pass 6.52 126.9 15.6 4.22 3761 412.425 638.625
Option 22 161.2 73 234.2 Pass 4.14 127.3 15.7 4.23 3791 413.725 647.925
Option 23 161.2 80 241.2 Pass 4.14 127.3 15.7 4.23 3791 413.725 654.925
Option 24 161.2 74 235.2 Pass 4.14 127.3 15.7 4.23 3791 413.725 648.925
Option 25 161.2 72 233.2 Pass 6.52 126.9 15.6 4.22 3761 412.425 645.625
Option 26 161.2 66 227.2 Pass 6.52 126.9 15.6 4.22 3761 412.425 639.625
Option 27 161.2 42 203.2 Pass 3.60 127.3 15.7 4.23 3791 413.725 616.925
Option 28 161.2 50 211.2 Pass 2.74 127.3 15.7 4.23 3793 413.725 624.925
Option 29 161.2 52 213.2 Pass 3.81 127.6 15.7 4.24 3823 414.7 627.9
Option 30 161.2 65 226.2 Pass 3.60 127.3 15.7 4.23 3791 413.725 639.925
Option 31 161.2 59 220.2 Pass 3.60 127.3 15.7 4.23 3791 413.725 633.925
Option 32 161.2 46 207.2 Pass 5.73 127 15.6 4.22 3763 412.75 619.95
Option 33 161.2 48 209.2 Pass 6.79 127.3 15.7 4.23 3793 413.725 622.925
Option 34 161.2 44 205.2 Pass 6.79 127.3 15.7 4.23 3793 413.725 618.925
Option 35 161.2 51 212.2 Pass 6.38 126.7 15.6 4.21 3761 411.775 623.975
Option 36 161.2 57 218.2 Pass 6.38 126.7 15.6 4.21 3761 411.775 629.975
Option 37 161.2 20 181.2 Pass 4.99 127.5 15.7 4.23 3807 414.375 595.575
Option 38 161.2 35 196.2 Pass 4.99 127.5 15.7 4.23 3807 414.375 610.575
Option 39 161.2 43 204.2 Pass 2.00 127.8 15.7 4.24 3838 415.35 619.55
Option 40 161.2 49 210.2 Pass 1.55 127.8 15.7 4.25 3842 415.35 625.55
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